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The study of economics is justified more by the practical uses of economics than by its 
aesthetic value. Ec:onomists  therefore feel obligated to  offer policy advice on various issues 
on which they do rmi have compelling evidence. That is  to the good. But they are  terrlpteri in 
these cdses to  lay ciaim to more certainty than is warranted,  in part because consumers of' 
econnmics, that is oolicyrrmkers and students, want  unequivocal answers. Moreover,  iheir 
iivals, e.g,,  jourr~aiists  and poi~iicians  arc:  no: at all relirciant lo oidersiate the  value nf  their 
wares. El.!!  exaqqe-a"lr1~i  .. .  ti-:..  degree cf  cor~fidenct:  ihai one s conclhii-;!ens warrar~t  can i~?ad  r!: 
a degradat~on  or the debate vdithir~  the pri-,fes:;icxl  as sciiools form lhat pay insuific!ent 
atieniiori lo what  others are saying. arid as battle lines are sharply drawn. 
I will argue that this is what has happened with respect to the debate about whether 
central banks should undertake  counter-cyclical policy or  have the money stock grow at a 
stable rate. I do noi: claim that the participants  intentionally overstate their cases or ignore 
what the other side is saying; they believe in what they say. But their motivation is not the 
issue. What matters  is the outcome,  an unwarranted claim to knowledge that has retarded 
understanding, in part by posing a false dichotomy. The methodological obstacle  to resolving 
the debate has not been some subtle issue, such as economists not knowing their Popper, or 
adhering to an outdated philosophy of science, but a failure to stay within the bounds of 
rational conversation. It would be interesting to see if a similar  tendency  shows up in the 
natural sciences as they deal more with  issues of environmental policy. INTRODUCTlORl 
The two sides to the debate are the monetarists, lead by Milton Friedman, Karl Brunner and 
Allan Meltzer who advocate  that the money supply should grow at a fixed, or at least stable 
rate.  and those who advocate counter-cyclical monetary policy. I will. rather loosely refer to the 
latter as "~e~nesians".'  I deal only with the questiorl whether discretionary counter-cyclical 
policy (henceforth just called counter-cyclical policy) is feasible, and not with the entire issue of 
the quantity theory vs. Keynesian theory. It is quite possible that Keynesian theory is superior- 
to the quantity theory; for example, that fiscal policy has a powerfirl effect oil  GDP, and 
accounts for' as large propc~rtior;  sf the GDP variance than do c:i-langes  i!l  tho rrioney supply. 
and yet effective counter-cyclical policy cannof :;iicceed  because of  lags, forecast errors anli 
rjri?;::~;~r;li\age!'~i  i;robler;is.  C;onver:;c?ly,  there ji;  ri~ti~ing  in the cjiiai;tily  theory that cler;ii'.s tilet 
?ifica::y  nf  ~o~itr":~;ycIii;:??l  rsv.>r!&lry  pcj/ji:y. Ti.)i:;  paper iiler.efi>l'e  de;;ii;  cr!ly  wi';t; part of  th!-: 
Ksyrif?sian-r~~r:~net:1r1.~~t  dst)ate. I also cfo  not take up the s~ibseqiient  debate between the 
Keynesians and the New Classicals. sirice that irivolves quite different issues. 
I start with 1947 when Milton Friedman published his critique of Abba Lerner's 
recommendations for stabilization policy. and essentially end forty years later, wirn just a  brief 
look ad  the subsequent literature. Although the debate has continued beyond 1987, it has 
been substantially influenced by new factors: the breakdown in the stability of velocity in the 
early 1980s, the widespread acceptance of time-inconsistency as a major problem for 
monetary policy, and the consequent emphasis on feedback rules. Since the paper is long it may be useful to  outline the various steps. I start by 
discussing the nature of the  issue and the background in which it arose before turning to the 
mon~etarist  case. One part of  this case is that since  monetary policy operates with long and 
variable lags, and  since central banks have only a limited ability to forecast.  effective counter- 
cyclcal policy is  not feasible. This  requires looking at the length and variability of the lag, arid 
at th~e  Keynesians  answer that control theory show that such a policy is feasible after all. I 
then turn to the other part of the  monetarists' case, that  even if effective stabilization policy 
were technically feasible, cer;,,al  banks would be unlikely to carry oirt such a policy. While 
rnc;r!etarisls have offer:i csnsirierable. but not (,O~CI~IS~V~?  h~storicai  evidence or!  this issire. 
Ksymwsians have largely brushed it aside ivith disda~n,  perhaps cx: the grwnds thai rnorietaris: 
vjev,::; arc:: driver! by itjeology. S~ib..;t!(.li.;e:ltiy  I rll.:,riiss  l!)?:  Ksy;>e.c;iai)  r:;iiic:isr;l,,  of  a fived 
n~ur!eta!y  grovitti-rate ~i.;l~;..  ai?d  then  tilrrl to t?!r;f:~ir'ii:.ai  tests, ,rind lo sr,:rjc  receni cievc-?ii.jpmc~r~~:~ 
that have ctiarqed this debate.  This ~vhole  debate is  tiartfly a model of McCioskey's !1CjK5! 
"c;nod i:onversatiorl". and  I ask what went wrong. The following two sections deal with fhe 
relation of this ciebate to some literature on philosophy of science, and suggest some reasons 
why the debate was not more productive. 
WHAT IS THE QUESTION? 
The issue is often formulated as "rules versus authorities", that is as a discretionary monetary 
policy versus a stable growth-rate rule for some monetary aggregate. Such a broad formulation 
is dubious. One should distinguish between at least three regimes, that is rules governing 
policy actions. One is a strict rule, that requires the central bank to generate  a specific growth 
rate for a particular monetary aggregate, come what may. The second, a moderate rule, allows 
the central bank to change the monetary growth rate in response to supply shocks, or to 
perceived secular changes in velocity and in potential real growth, but not for the sake of undertaking counter-cyclical policy. The third, is our current system of discretionary  policy in 
which the central bank is free to vary the monetary growth rate for any purpose. Within these 
three regimes different variants are possible. For example, a central bank may be permitted to 
undertake counter-cyclical policy only in response to severe cycles, or else. decisions to 
respfond  to perceived secular changes in velocity and to supply shocks may require approval 
by the legislature. While Friedman (1960) has ;advocated the strict version of the monetary 
rule, Brunner (1  984) has advocated a carefc!!!y circurnscribed rrloderate version. 
These three regirr~es  shoi~ld  riot  be confounded. Eviderice against the strict  rille is  not 
~~ece:;i;arily  evidence against  the moderate r'uk. For example  it kvo~rld  ha!u~-l  bee;?  a disaster 
had '&re Fed. a(.Iop:ed a siric? rrionetar'y r!iIe  in  1980, because of  the ~~:bseq;ierit  sharp fal! ii? 
tkj:;t  s+;r::jl,:~r.  tr.ei)(.i of  !dei!:,ci!y,  {.i\.it rhai (jne.:;  i.;i:jt  :~Is:$I; tliat  ri)(j(.ler,fite  ri.i\s.  v/jih  it..;  pifif;ii!i:i~;.~ 
a  ,,.  cjf c(:~:jn!f$t.-~\j<:l;<;,:?!  k><,i;~y  L','!.;c;!(.i  b);)~?!  be:e:{\  k.,;;lc:j,  &lrr:;\;:{!ty,  f;>dia../;>r:{;t.;  [k):it  cgrllriji  [j;.:{l:.  (.ii.;e:, 
ilci ;.~osst:ss the :i-itorrnaiio!~  req~iireci  for etiecrive disi:i:+i~oclarv  co!.ir'~ter.-cyciicai  poiicy  cic:?c-,  ,i(;i 
suffice to estabiish the case for a strict r-noneta~y  g~'~~vtli-rate  rule. 
Furthermore, suppose there is strong einpirical evidence that discretionary  rn~netary 
policy has led to a better outcome than a strict monetary rule would have done. This does not 
suffice to  make the case for counter-cyclical monetary policy,  because the superior~ty  of 
discretionary  policy could be due entirely to its accommodation of  secular changes in velocity. 
Conversely, if a monetary rule  shows a better outcome, a policy of responding only to secular 
and not to cyclical changes in velocity might be better  still. 
In the vehemence of the debate  such refinements  have often been ignored. 
Mon'etarists have frequently written as though convincing evidence that central banks lack the 
information and the resolve needed for effective counter-cyclical policy suffices to establish the 
case for a stable monetary growth-rate rule, while Keynesians have often argued as though the existence of secular changes in velocity and the occurrence of supply shocks provides a 
compelling case for counter-cyclical policy. 
BACKGROUND 
It is certainly not surprising that by, say 1946 counter-cyclical stabilization policy had become a 
central tenet of mainstream economics as taught in most leading American universities. 
Although this was hardly a new contribution of the General Theory (see Keynes. 1924), the 
General Theory had provided such policy with a much more coherent theorettcal justification. 
aru-i the Great Depression had appeared to give it s practical jusfification. 
1-emer's Eci.)~i~ir:!'cs  of Coni~d  (1  8144)  provides a paradigm of  the ;'new ei:~~ncxni~~"." 
Monetary policy, hsving heen ireed from the constraint of the gold standard arid the irrahional 
.  .  c~r~slraiotr  of  "~:thi3dox  fi;?a!!c~'',  car! QoV'i  be !.!i;eci  e!?tireiy for  :io!rlesij::  goals  v!iti-i 
ji-lie!iiatjoflai ec;:jiii@rii~!.~-~  i,;i.;n<{  i'~i3i~jd  ~!:ith f)f.';ij~-l f)eC)iect.  <;g:ir:t."r'-cyc,ljcai fiscal i;o/ir:y  !;(i 
longer r?et?d:; a spec!ai j~bsiificatior?  now that Keynes has decisively refuted the so-cai8ec.i 
"Treasury View" that government deficits ixowd out private expenditures doll;,  for dollar, and 
that Lerner has shown that an internally held government debt is tiarmless. 
Lerner could therefore set out the following welfare-maximizing rules for macro psiicy: if 
aggregate demand is insufficient then lower taxes, raise government expenditures, or lower 
interest rates. If aggregate demand is excessive do the opposite.  The appropriate choice 
between these three tools depends on microeconomic considerations, that is on the marginal 
social products of consumption. government expenditures and investment.'  To finance its 
deficits the government should either print money or, if it wants interest rates to rise, borrow. It 
~  ~  . .  .,  .  Ir.  15s.; C;cit.ovsky  caL  Led  it.  "cil~  ~e.~.er;j,;  .;-  3cr~e~t  ed :'ra~?w~??-k.  wWl'3:::  w~-~?;.c 
!:%!yly  p?.'k:kps  :[!<-:;:  ,  ~;-~~L8:):~l]~sc~   hi.:;'^  3:..d  :;L~:J~?  ,jk,~,~t  f ip:::!l  ::.;,>::p~~~~j~ 
poii"~."  iScitL2-vsky,  1.334,  p.  1561) 
,  >  ,  .  Li.rfi.5"~  bcc,l.r deals :n;r:irliy  u:;rl  :rllcr..i._:(:or:ar,;i::y,  and  ~7~;t  i?le sc\~j:~ 
.  -  c&77i::11ziiti~,?n rlile~:  fcr ec:nnc1:llc  -f tici~:n:y  anpll.:ahle  cr-  bath cap;t.a.i~is;:  crci 
,  . 
:jar: j~ii  .  .L st:  ~'CCI~~II:  1  ~'y  . all seemed very simple. except for the task of inducing politicians and the general public to 
abandon their irrational prejudice. Macropolicy has finally reached the age of enlightenment in 
which reason rather than tradition and prejudice govern. Indeed, it is likely that much of the 
enthusiasm for the Keynesian revolution resulted from its seeming ability to make economists 
extraordinarily useful. In the 1960s there was much debate about whether the business cycle 
still existed, or had been eliminated by modern macroeconomic policy. 
Lerner was a theorist with little, if any interest in institutions.' HI-  saw his role as setting 
out abstract ecnilotr'iic pr'incip!es. with the problems of irnpleinentztiorl left to administrators. 
l:l'hile  other ec;onor!-lists, particularly the institution;aIists,  held a less piire view of ei:onornii:s,  i'i 
is stili true that by i.r:ode!-n star~dards  n~airisti'earn  rnx:oecono;nics  at that time showeci iiliie 
.  .. 
Cc~)~~;t'r'i  :~~i!):  ff);:  ;;ir]:>ler~ls  :t;at  :i(!st:  ir!inj$rrlt?rjti:l~  ttir)jj, fi~jicy  recori;rri~r)cjat[or;s  F(;,- 
exarijpie,  ii; ":he  i 550s  rnar!y  ec<::r\i'>i.i?isti..,  i,van!e(,i to rr1~b.e  i'iscai policy mere i'lexibie  by tladir;cj 
Congpess  grant tile president the power to adj!.ir;t  tax rates as econornic conditions i:tiariye. 
They coiiid not iirtderstanrl why practical politicians scoffed at this "logical" step. Simiiarly, unti! 
the ia,te 1950s alrnost nothing had been published on the lags oi  monetary policy. 
It would be going too far to say that most macro-economists were unconcerned with aii 
practical details. For example. they were willing to specify by how much interest rates should 
be changed. But they did not feel  compelled to work through all the steps required to translate 
their general policy prescriptions into coherent advice in a world in which policymakers have 
imperfect information and  serious principaljagent problems exist At the time that did not seem 
an interesting set of problems. Insufficient attention to such problems was prevalent in 
microeconomics, too. This deficiency of mainstream macroeconomics soon came under attack. In his review 
article of Lerner's Economics of Control, Friedman 11947) mounted  a powerful methodological 
critique by arguing that Lerner purported to give practical advice, when he actually did little 
mom than tell the government that it should behave intelligently. To Friedman the question of 
whether his policy recommendations can be effectively implemented is not something that an 
economist should ignore. 
To make ... [his recommendations for counter-cyclical policy into] a prescription 
to "produce full employment," Lerner must tell us how to know when there is 
"insufficient totai derna,  ,d,"  whether this insufficiency is a iernporary deficiency 
irr  the process of  being corrected or the beginning of an increasing deficiency. ... 
He must tell us  how to knaw whdt medicine to use when a diagnosis has beei-i 
rnacie, how lar'gs a cdosi? to give. ar;d how long we may  expect it ro  lake for tile 
med~cine  to be effective  The casual re;3cier of Lerner's $oak  o:  fo,r :!;3:. 
,y:a,f:ei. !2f  f:'?!?  r~ai3i7f~  ,  , nf  :::G!-/<S o!:  ~~)nfi!2j  nf  [he  bi:s!,~!~s,~  cycie - -  !night 
P.Y-.  3  sijppose :hat  ti!i?se are simple q\ir-lstic!r',.;  ..  . :  I ;:ley are a!:ythli'igj btil ~ii>~;\l~. 
A;) easy nr-is\iti:;.:.  [I:] t!jese ~iif?i~~iilj,n~  1.~2  s;:!;  tii&  ,,  ei-roi.:;  I!]  these aeii:ri7s  di'o 
~,iiiimpo;tar!'r  Sii'iCS they (;a!;  be cc~rrected  qi.ii;:kIy.  .  ./-his  arls~~ei.  1%.  of  cui.iisc too 
easji.  it cot-iflicts with the harcl fact that ntliihe:  governrnerii action not' the eifeci 
of that action is i!.~stantar!eoirs.  ... Unfor-iiri'iately. it is likeiy that the time lays are 
a substantial fraction of the duratio!?  of the cyeiicai movemer:ts. ... By the time 
an  error is recognized arid correc.tive actron taken. the damage may he clone, 
and the corrective action may itself tcrrti mto a further error  This prescription of 
Lerrier's ... thus turns into an exhortation to do the right thing with no advice how 
to know what is the right thing to do. (Fr~edman.  1947, pp. 41  3-15, emphasis 
added.) 
I have quoted this passage at length because it sunmarizes so well, about thirty years 
before Keynesian theory lost its hegemony, one of the two basic monetarist challenges to the 
prevailing Keynesian consensus on macro-policy, which are that due to the lag in its .effects 
monetary policy is too inflexible, and second that central banks are often motivated by goals 
that conflict with stabilization. 
LAGS AND FORECAST ERRORS 
Friedman returned to the question whether governments know enough to conduct an effective 
stabilization policy in his "The Effects of a Full-Employment Policy on Economic Stabilization: A Formal Analysis", originally published in French in 1951 and reprinted in his Essays in Positive 
Ecor~ornics  (1953):  In it he poses the following questions: "Under what conditions will counter- 
cyclical action succeed in its objective of reducing instability? Under what conditions will it 
actually increase instability? How does its effectiveness depend on the magnitude of action'? " 
(Friedman. 1953, p. 11  7) Thus Friedman goes much further than others towards posing the 
practical questions thai have to 5e answered for stabilization policy to be implemented 
effectively. Yet he is almost apologetic for tbe abstraction of his analysis, writing: 
The preseirt note ionsiders these ques1:ions on a highly farrnal level. its purpose 
is primarily to r-mke clear that thq  are iinpot-tant and  i-eievant questions; 
secondarily  to indicate in general terms the cmsideratic;ns  on which an LA,  rir.  ISW~S 
in any particular case depends. (Friedman. '1953. p.  17) 
stabilkat~or~  po!ky,  r;'y  is  the size of  the :;tabilii!ation  policy (measured by the change ir? 
income that it generates), and R is the correlation coeff~cient  of (7'-  and c-i2*  that is the measure 
of how  well timed the stabilization policy is. The optimal size of the stabilization policy  equals .. 
Ro,,  and the policy will be destabilizing if sJo, :-  -R. This implies that it is far from ~bvious  that 
the central bank can succeed. in significantly reducing the magnitude of fluctuations. If it 
adopts a strong policy it may well be destabilizing . while a modest and cautious policy means 
that it cannot do much good.  It is by no means unreasonable to expect even an only 
moderately ambitious central bank  to destabilize income. Assume for example, that the central 
bank tries to offset, say one third of the standard deviation of income. It surely does not know with any accuracy by how much it has to change interest rates or the growth rate of reserves to 
set ci,in,=  113. And suppose it does change income by just this amount, its policy will be 
destabilizing if the change in income is badly timed, so that R < -0.7. But to time the polky 
better than that the central bank has to predict with sufficient accuracy the behavior of income 
in the absence of the policy, that is o,,  as well as the distributed lag in the effect of its policy. 
Does the central bank possess the required knowledge? friedman does not provide 
any estimates of the relevant parameters, and hence cannot answer this q~resiion.  Indeed, 
giver1 the available data, there is no way in which he could have estirrlaieiJ ther~~.  Gilt what he 
does ::;how  is that in the absence of s!.ipportiag  ernpir'ical evidence one car;ncsr r!isni~ss  exit sf 
i;ar:ci  the hypott~esis  that a siibsiarlt~al  stabilinition poiicy is  ~TWF:  likeiy to destabiiire ttiar;  I5 
:;tabi]j;:$  j;)ccj:ne.  !!-I  w(:!i.d:;,  f'i.ie(]ir;r~!::  cfi;j  r)c,r  !eft,[$  illit K,c.-yrlesia!;  heii:!  i;) ti!.,-+ 
eff~c;iive?.~ess  of st;-ib:iii.ati~~  !:oiii;y  kt.;[ Ile ciiri ~;hoi.~j  ,\ithcr'  tb:is  beiief ri2.;leri  ill1 3;:  ~~rlstrppor-{c:r: 
ass~mptio!?,  and conjectir:ed  that this ass:rrnption  IS  invalid. 
The severity of this problem was even greater at the trine Frieclman's paper appearea 
than it is now. The Federal Reserve did riot inske any explicit forecasts of GDP, indeed until 
well into the postwar period the Federal FZese~e  Board's staff was forbidden to make any 
forecast. and staff members could be fired for making one. To be sure, policymakers had to 
make implicit forecasts but they presumably did so primarily by projecti~g  current conditions 
and trends into the future. Since at that time the Fed appeared to believe that monetary policy 
affects income with only a very short lag, this was not entirely unreasonable. But  the Fed had 
no evidence that the lag of monetary policy was short, and apparently had not even studied 
this problem. Moreover,  there is no reason to think that the Fed, or anyone else around the 
time, knew vith any degree of accuracy by how much a given change in the interest rate or the 
money supply would change GDP. Let us imagine that one were writing a rational reconstruction of a debate  on monetary 
rules  that obeyed the basic rides on which jirst about all methodologists -- except for the 
Austrians -- are in agreement. Economists would then have reacted in one of three ways. One 
is to follow up on Friedman's analysis by seeing  when data on Fed forecasts became 
available if the empirical estimates of n?/u',  and R support Friedman's conjecture that a 
stabilizat~oti  policy sf significant size cannot succeed. The second is to present an aiternative 
framework that allows one to test this conjecture. The third is to admit that we do not know 
stabii~maricr!  policy. 'he  si~ni-of-variances  papel- has been occasionally  referred to, but with 
one exception the c~tatiorrs  I  found are not. critical; niostiy they are hat-tipptny citations that 
merely mentioned the paper, or cited it approvingly, or else ~~sed  it rather than criticized it. The 
one exception is a paper (Orr. 1960) pointing out that Friedman's framework applies only to a 
policy of stabilizing GDP around a given trend, and not to a policy that tries to reduce the gap 
between actual and potential GDP. Yet for much of the postwar period the emphasis was as 
much, if not more, on the latter than on the former. But Friedman made it clear that he was 
considering only counter-cyclical policy.6 
There is, however, at least one paper that seems to criticize Friedman's conclusion, 
though without citing his paper. Buiter (1  981) showed that a closed-loop system, that is a system in which policy responds to the state of !he economy, is superior to an open-loop 
system. This is formally correct if, as Buiter postulates, the authorities respond correctly. 
Buitor's results can readily be obtained within Friedman's framework. As long as R is negative 
there is some stabilization policy, however weak. that redrxes the variance of income. 
Hence, in a formal sense, Friedman's skepticism with respect !o  any counter-cyclical 
policy however small cann~t  be justified on the basis of lags and forecast errors alone. But this 
formal result does not necessarily have rriuch practical significance. If R. tho~~gh  negative is 
very srnail in ah~olute  terms, :,.sn  even em  ideal counter-cyclical policy wo~il?  rediice 
flii~t\i:~ti(.~i>s  only very sl~ghtly.  For exarxple, sl.rppose that R  = -0.2.  Then, on the strong 
assirmptio;;  that tlie cer\t.ral  bank estirnat2s correctly ti-re effect of its policy action or! GDP, it 
{.:(>f.{![)  :~/~j)!~~J~j~~  (.)[ii)  L&  c)c?r<;(<!'!? cjf tf)::  ,,~:\[i{>f'!(;F!  (,~f  k!!!!  sif2i:;<?  1s  (l[l[;$?rf>)i~l  :ji)(>(j!  !:)<.?  e?fit:f;: 
..,  ..  cjf I:$,  p(jli;.;y  f>r)  :JL.II~~ I:  ~h~~.i!<j  ~i~:.r;  ;:I[  jys:;  [).,;i:i 4  ~j~>~(:f$i;[,  S~ZV~  :2  p?sc:6:rl:.  TII~  t;e?.~:;fi!  <>!  c?v::I) 
swi; :::  srrmli redi;i.:i!on  iri the GDF:'  variance is t'ix j11:;i  ahoot any economy gre;7ter.  tbarl the cost 
of iifidertaking the required open nlarket operations and the required research. It may 
therefore sewn that Buites has refuted Friedman's claim that because of lags and forecast 
errors counter-cyclical policy cannot be stabilizing at all. But Friedrnan has not made such a 
strong claim. He only clain~s  that (a) lags and forecast errors severely limit the extent to which 
counter-cyclical policy can reduce fluctuations, and instead may cause such a policy to be 
destabilizing, and (b) that central banks usually pursue policies that are badly designed from 
the viewpoint of stabilization. 
Since it is most foolhardy to say that a certain a certain paper has been explicitly cited 
critically only once. I will not do so. But I can say that if  another explicit criticism of Friedman's 
sum-of-variances paper was published it was an outlier that did not play a meaningful role in the debate.' And it is most icnlikely that there is much of a literature that like Buiter (1981) 
responded to Friedman's paper without citing it. 
The neglect of these two papers cannot be due to economists not being aware of them. 
Friedman's review articie appeared in the Journai of Polificai Economy. hardly an obscure 
source, while his "Formal Analysis " essay appeared in a book that had high visibility, since it 
contains his much-cited essay on the methodology of positive econo~~~ics.  Indeed, rightly or 
wrongly, William Wh~te  (1961. p. 142) referred to it as "well-known", and as "one of the niasi 
important sources of this sitepticism aboul, anticyc!ica\  measures." And the fai!ure to respcnd Ir: 
Firetiman can hardly be attributed to a tendency to Ignore the work of a yoirny. unkilo~v:! 
Moreover, Friedman was not the only one who contended that stabilization policy tsiyht 
very easily be destabiiiziny. Three years later A. W. Phillips j1957), who had formulated the 
economic stabilization problem in a control-theory setting, concluded that: 
[l]f the lags in the real economic system are at all similar to those we have used 
in the models it is unlikely that the period needed to restore any desired 
equilibrium conditions after an economy has experienced a severe disturbance 
could be much less than two years, even assuming that the regulating 
authorities use the policy which is most appropriate to the real system of relationships existing in the economy, As these relationships are not known 
quantitatively, it is unlikely that the policy applied will be the most appropriafe 
one, it may well cause cyclicai fluctuations rather than eliminate them. ('Phillips, 
1957. p. 276, emphasis added.) 
Subsequently. William Baumol (1961) also using control theory analyzed the effects of 
stabilization policy, both with and without lags, in the setting of a multiplier-accelerator model. 
He described his results as: "... somewhat frightening. Plausible and reasonable contracyclicd 
policies turn out to be capable of increas'ing  the explasivenes and frequency of ecanarnic 
I--ie pi'2iilti:d  olit that lo~~~j  and v:~siable !a\.:; are !lot li'ie basic issiie, lnstc:.ad, li.1~  basic issiic 55, 
ivl~e~lie!'  the centrai bank possesses eiwkryh ii-iformatim  tibout the future course of GDP a;:d 
abwt ihe effec!s of  its poiicy. Rut Brunnei' did not present as eleyarit a forrnlilation of the 
problem as Fnedman had done. 
These paper's had little if any effect on the prevailing consensljs, as shown, for 
example, by the treatment of stabilization policy in elementary textbooks.  One possibility  is 
that th5y were not considered  a major challenge, because although they established the 
possibility that counter-cyclical policy is destabilizing they did not provide any empirical 
evidence to support their conjecture that such policy actually is destabilizing. This possible 
explanation needs detailed discussion. 
Empirical Implementation 
In Friedman's formulation the parameters that determine whether macro policy is srabilizing are 
the size of policy-induced variance in GDP relative to the initial variance and the correlation of these two variances. Assuming that the central bank is single-mindedly devoted to stabilization 
policy (an issue discussed below), this correlation depends on the accuracy with which it can 
forecast GDP and predict the effects of its policy. 
One determinant of the ability to forecast GDP is the horizon of the forecast. Obviously. 
if the lag in the effect of monetary policy were a decade, then stabilization woirid be a hopeless 
task, while, if it were, a week, then a central bank that is well informed about current GDP 
should be an effective stabilizer. Not only would its estimate of the deviation of GDP from its 
targel: be accurate, but if it would make a rrtistake iri estimating this deviaticm, or  iri estimaii:?g 
the el'tizcl of  its poiicy on GDF"  ~i coi.rld readily reverse its  pclicy. 
rnorrth:;  at trougr1s. [Friedrnar:,  I%?)  Using 1nsteac.1  ot turning points in the gro:vth  rste of 
money, the dates at which persistent changes in the money growth rate occurred, the lay is 
shorter, five months at the peaks and four months at trough. All of these are rneasures only of 
the "outside lag", that is the lag between the change in the growth rate of the money supply 
and c.yclical turning points, thus excluding the lag between the time a change in monetary 
policy is needed and the time at which the Fed changes the money supply.g 
Many other estimates made around the same time, or shortly thereafter, using various 
methlods reached roughly similar results. So did a number of subsequent studies that 
measured the lag in monetary policy by seeing for how long an increase in the quantity of money lowers the interest rate."  Although a few studies of the lag found it to be much shorter 
than Friedman and Schwartz's estimate, this was not true for most. 
However, Friedman and Schwartz's estimate of the lag was challenged by John 
Culk~ertson  (1960) and by John Kareken and Robert Solow (1963).  But,: although Kareken and 
Solalw claim that their- data show a shorter lag than Friedman's, this is not so." Culbterson's 
conceptual criticism is more telling and led to a debate with Friedman (Culbertson, 1961. 
Friedman, 1961) in which the main issues were Friedman and Schwartz's comparison of the 
turning points in the mfe  of ck;..,?,~ge  of  money with turning points in esseritiallv the /we!  of 
bus:i-it>ss  activity, and also the direction c:f caiimlity between money  anei income 
Tiiis debaie was si!perseded by the del3pei-  criticisn! of William Brainafd and .lames 
.  .  To:-iitl ( 1 $!sfij  ;j!.!:  T~ok>ii;  { j97(11) j$;t>j,::?:  ;;,  ;>il)\]~~~~ip~~  i;? ti??:;-  klasi:;  (;f)~]/pf>c-~j to ~-;.j~.::j~j>,;~~~;'>, 
;;-~te~~~,.l-;ct~  of  (:,;:,\;~:~~  ~~~~:~~l~~cjl~  frr,;~;  tj~li;:  ~1;-~1i~i~.;  ~3;  cblci!?<.ys  ic;  i-j?(liiei,  -I,;(] j!;  ilpcL3;).;c2.  ~~;lj~~i::~~,~ 
>,  ?  L 
anci Tobin sirn~iiated  a srrlali ecot?ornetric: ~-r?odei  that exl:iibi:ed niany cases in whici-I peak:; 
eniicgenous variables lead peaks in  exogenous variables. Tobin the1i dernonstraiecl this !-e~uii 
for- two  theoretical models, one Keynesian and one monetarist.  By showing that  simple, and 
hence feasible procedures can give misleading resiilts, Brainard and Tobin showed the 
difficulty of  doing empirical work in this area. And  inability to see exactly what inside the 
bowels of the Brainard-Tobin model produced their counter-intuitive  conclusions  perhaps 
further weakened the faith of economists in empirical work in this area. 
K?i~.ek%:~  a:;d  Solcw est::~r.?:t. laqs f?~  v~L~I~I.~:;  ri'pes  of  exc?r.di-.~;r~s,  c-.:.:  -i- 
.  .  r.,;,~ 2:yfit:x:  r.2  th,y!:  iritc a-1  ;iipral 1  ;ticj.  Wher:  c:;e Ljies .;2  >;;.>  cb~air-s  i:; ;  :<- :  r,!:~, 
cf  ch?  La?  that:  is not  shorter tzar; F'risd:nan's,  see  :K\ier YC355!  .  Sri  S?~?:-FA.:, 
ti:?  Ka!-cken - Solr;w  paa2r  appear:;  t> be ar;r?,ewha:  i:lcar!:r-.lr-;:.-.  ,  wFii r::l  -l~iqk!+  pc;:.:'ai~  - 
>i ?xpldired hy  i:  helng 2  cc:nm!lscio~F:d  p?per-  1:frc:r- the ~Ccnin?issir,!;  .>n  Moni;.  2::: 
r,  , .  _.  _ri:~  t :  ttic-:t  was wrj~t-e-!  :.:r:der  a .r':i_.adlin:::. One part of Friedman's reply to his critics contains a point that is central to his 
measurement of the lag. This is that his conclusion that money is causal is based much more 
on the historical evidence drawn from specific instances of changes in the money supply (see 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963b), than it is on the finding that turning points in money precede 
turning points in income. He therefore referred to the turning-point evidence as "by no rneans 
decisive."( Friedman, 1961, p. 449) But while his historical evidence may well be strong 
enough to support the quantity theory, it doe.  not provide any justification for deriving the lag 
of rnorletary poky  frcm  a comparison of tl,lrning  points in rnoney and iricorne. Here Friednl~ri 
is relying or1  evidence itmi he hirr?seif  doe.;  rmt  consider decisive. 
... 
i he cc>ntiove~sy  aboui Fr~erfmari's  ineasi,irer.i~eni  of it;e  lag soirr~ds  iiaieci becaiis~ 
1!<>i;1:-1.:\:1;is  tile stan:iarrl  p1i?r::eti<!ie  ri:;r'  esi,i;.ia!i!!;j  tilt:  13i.j  is  (1;:;  ari ec~)i!~r~~;?!ri~.:  ri'iu~j.'.'j  is 
.  , 
s:r:)(;;;;y:;  ?!)(;  $ftc;c[  <)f 21 (;?);.r?-;cj~:  ;r;[)[lc{;li)t  pQjir;.y ,L\$  tbj?.;  <~x;~~~\;ji~~  Q;I;<;~)  i;~  [i.;g:  ,L',;;r~i?r)<jjx  .  , 
shmv. these si!niiIat;ions usciaiiy exh~hit  lags ihal are 1c;iiges  ttlar~  those estitsln'ltxi by Fi.isliriaii 
and Schw:.uk.  'This is not  siir~~sii;ing  sirice in such essei!tially Keynesian models rrl~.;ch  of the 
effect of monetary policy or) expenditures usually comes through the long-term interest rate. 
arid that rate is  treated as adjusting only :;lowly  to changes in the instruments that the ceritrai 
bank controls directly. 
Suppose the econometric models are correct and the lag of monetary policy is as long 
as they show. Does that prevent stabilization policy from succeeding?  he  answer is not 
..  .  ,  . 
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,..  %hen :rA.r;reat.  rat  ?s fs  LI  .  1.:  so,  :a  3qu:ihc~i:i:  ti-,?  :nonzy  market  ir,t:-.r+:.'. 
~ ..._  -, -  t:.,  ,.  '.  :Id3Ji3 ';i:  fill:  fLl:th.?l  L!:;l:-,  t-ki~y  wc:;li  rlc  ;?tkl'~l-:'~'~Yi?,  ~?;IJS  $;~:111.:1~;j~~Tl~l 
.3~~:  -...  .  t  i ..7n31  :!?.;est.:nent  ?3~  ,y  in ::he  pericd, 31-2 r ?~~.rii~~  [:he wziyhr:e-1  ~esr,  1~2,:; 
-, 
1  s  I.  r  sty  :if: I:  :  :  r  w;;ll  =hi_. '  im-r;:;  :  f :  :;e :'f-ft2c~  3- 
. .  - -,  ~:?r.~t.ii~~-,~  ps?;cy  :-?w  depe:::5ing  s.i  :ags  in the rno:lEy  denanrl  f,.;nc:-lcc  2s  ,c:, 
,  1:  L;$::s  :  +  ,.,c  ;,,,  tl.x[perldltcre f~11:~t  i 1::s.  d,?~c\ier  'Tur'kerf  s arg:-;r,er'; -:pp';p;  j-.:.~,! obvious, and raises five questions. first, what is the relation between the length of the lag and 
the central bank's forecast errors? Second,  how does the length of the lag affect the feasibility 
of offsetting prior errors? Third, can the central bank estimate the length of the lag with 
sufficient precision? Fourth, does the lag vary  substantially  from case to case, so that 
knowledge of the average lag does not suffice? Fifth, can the central bank predict the effect of 
its actions on GDP closely enougli? 
At first glance it may seem obvio~.is  that the longer- the lag, and hence the forecast 
ha-izon,  the less accurate is thc? forecast. But that is not necessarily so. On tile one hai~ci,  ii  is 
obvioiisly easier to estimate what the gap between actual ancl clesireci GDP  wiil be next nioi-itl? 
Ltmn  what it will be,  say f~ve  years from  nclikv, because the economy will not ciiar?ge !T>L~c~  ii? 
oyle rn,;:;!:]  ti]:::  rie;::::j  [lo[  scj f:::  it?::;  i::;<(l'e!]:c-:  (::i.!!:jr)a:isoc>.  7%~  \ja;jabia  ti;;-lt  tile 
,  c:j,b,  t s.,  ,  :>  ~er-~i(:-j  b;3l3k  /-i>]s  10  f<)!-p~;~i~~  j:;  ti-!!!?  ;)!2i.~~i:;:;[:?qk  ::i:::l[:<-f> !!-; (;c;p  ~!iiil  QLC~~;~  :-  ,  ,  -'  tv  C. 
cri~arters  irotn now. hiut wh;?t the gap beh\j~~3r!  acfual a11c.j  desired GDP will be then. Arici ihe 
more qua~ters  titere are between the current quarter and the quarter being fo~.ecast.  the 
greater 1s  the chance that the errors made in estimates for the intervening quarters will cai-tcel 
out. It is therefore not surprising that, as Stephen McNees (1988, p. 22) found, although 
forecast errors do tend to decline as the forecast perioa is reduced,  at first "the improvement 
is quite gradual and summary error measures are virtually constant as the forecast horizon 
decreases. We know little more today about what will happen in a given quarter a year from 
now than we do about a quarter two years from now." 
Another, and probably more serious problem that a long lag creates relates to the 
reversibility of the effects of monetary po'licy. Assume that only 10 percent of the effect on 
GDP occurs in the first quarter, and  50 percent occurs in the fourth quarter. Suppose now that the central bank realizes that it has made a mistake and wants to reverse within the next 
quarter the effects of a restrictive policy that it adopted three quarters ago. It could, in principle, 
do so by initiating an expansionary policy that is five times as strong as the previous restrictive 
policy. Subsequently. it would then have to adopt an even stronger restrictive policy to offset 
the effects  of the strong expansionary policy in later quarters. But no central bank is likely to 
do that. It is often uncertain about what its policy should be, and that makes it reluctant to 
undertake strong policies that might later appear to ba wrong, if only because it has to be 
cor~cerried  about its reputation. Moreover, large policy shifts generate wide swirqs ~n  interest 
rates, and cc?rifral banks favor interest-['ate statiiiii>/.  'There is ever) some danger of irlstri.in~ei-~t 
der:ic.ii<q  its cui'i'enl policy stailce. The distributed lags yeneraterl by var!oiis ecunorr;?tr.ic 
rnc~dels  differ widely. The central bank has no way of knowing which lag estimate it shoulcl use 
because there is no way one can evaluate the accuracy of simulatio~s.  except for egregiously 
wrong ones.13 
Even if the central bank would know  which model's estimate of the distributed lag is 
correct, it would still face the problem that the models estimate only the mean lag. A central 
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&,-  j:.~,.rm-- r:;.  .~  L, ,2.  .  e  . bank deciding what to do at a particular time needs to know. not the average lag, but what the 
lag will be in this particular instance. There is no reason to assume that the variance of lags is 
small enough for the mean lag to be a reliable guide for specific policy decisions, 
When Friedrnan and Schwartz (1963b) measured the lag of monetary policy by 
comparing turning points in the growth rate of money and cyclical turning points they found the 
lag to be highly variable, But, as already, discussed such a comparison of turning points is not 
a good measure of the lag (See also Nlay,er, 1967.) Better evidence on the variarlce of the lag 
conies from two papers that ~.,~:d  variable-rxxfficierlt techniques. Cargill and Meyer ('978) 
estirmled  for. tl-!e 1950s and 196iIs the irnpact of rriorietaiy policy rn the St, Lcxiis madel wi-!ii 
also ir? a srnall Keyic'sinn model, al!ixvir;g the coefficients tc? vaiy over tiwe. They f'c.x.lnd  !ha? 
both if:?  leii<jth  an(.\  tile snape :!i  the tii.c;ti.ibci:ed la!.!  c!f  r?;i>rietar\; poiicy i,,a:!.-i-i  !,:,jr;ificaritiy, 
riepeiidin~  :iporl ?ivt;eri the policy ivarr i;~~~ii~iir~ti~:~.l.  Tt!ey ~!!q;~eCf  that this provides orie r:iiJ;e 
reason to :ivc.?id "ovi-:rly zesloirs" stah!lizaiian policies, tilough they left open the possibility ti':c~t 
the differences in lags might be predictable. J. E  Tarirw (1  979) considered this possibility  ir!  a 
paper using a si,nplified version of the St. Louis model. He found that the lag was subs?antialiy 
longer in the 1960s than in the 1(350s,  and that the length of lag strongly depends on the type 
of policy (with a restrictive policy having a longer lag than an expansionary policy). It also 
depends on the stage of the business cycle; in a recession policy is irnpotent for at least eight 
quarters. Moreover, the lag is longer for a tight policy than for a restrictive policy. 
These findings suggest that the estimate of the distributed lag that an econometric 
model provides, i.e., the mean lag for its sample period, is not sufficient for effective 
policymak~ng.  Admittedly, neither study is beyond criticism. Both use the St. Louis model. 
which has been heavily criticized (most effectively by Modigliani and Ando, 1976) and has 
performed very badly in recent years. To be sure, Cargill and Meyer also use a small 
Keynesian model. But that treats the morley supply as an exogenous policy variable, even though  the Fed largely accolnrnodates clhanges in the demand for money, so that this model 
may suffer from serious OLS bias. But if we reject the results of these two papers we have to 
admit that we do not know the variability of the lag at all, and that it may well be substantial." 
One might therefore expect that the Cargill and Meyer and Tanner papers played  a 
significant role in the debate about discretionary monetary policy. But they did not. Although 
the SSCl lists several citations for both papers, these citations are all in contexts other than the 
feasibility of discretionary policy. 
it is not clear jiist how much of a problem the variability of the lags creates. Haskei 
Benishay (!97'!  i,  i:sin<) 3 c;onti'oI thesty rnodei in which the central bank estimates Incon;(? ij,i 
.  . 
ai-I a~ilolyr-essivi?  ftl~ictio~?,  obtained the c.o~lllter-!tlttlltlt~e  resuit that the !-r:ore  vaiiabie the la;; 
{hs ::j!:~ja[,3;  is  cpfirnal stl.ik:jiization !;oij,;y.  I--lp;je!j?l-,  fri)ii?  .~ly)i>!f-:s:  :;':at?tj.;jj  iheo;y  iji:i:jsi,  a!~:; 
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[isi;!i.j a()  ;l!-;to;eg!.c:ssive  i;?i.e(;asi of  il.,:;ofi.z,  ,j Pfiiii!l:i C.oopei  Staniey Flscher (i9-(72;]) 
obtairjeii Ihe rrmre intuitivi.  resiiit that the more varrable the lag; ihe iess is the pay-off frorr; 
discretionary prircy. In another paper (2972b)  ihey shov~ecl  that in a certain type of rnodei it is 
the  variability of the  lag, and not its length that reduces the feasible degree of stabilization. 
All in all, it is far from  obvious whether the long lags shown by econometric models. 
and the variability of the lags shown by Cargill and Meyer and Tanner prevent an effective 
counter-cyclical policy altogether, or just reduce its effectiveness. To answer that question one 
would have to know, not just the length and variability of lag. but also how well the central bank 
can both forecast GNP, and predict by how much its policy actions change GDP. These 
questions attracted little, if any, attention in the context of the issue that Friedman raised. One must therefore conclude that the empirical literature just discussed, while important for other 
purposes, does not answer Friedman's challerlge.?"nstead  another approach was tried. 
Applying Control Theory 
In the second half of the 1960s and in the early 1970s as econometric models matured, a sub- 
literature developed that tested stabilization rules for monetary policy derived from control 
theory. The results now obtained differed sharply from Baumoi's earlier ones. A number of 
studies showed that if a particuiar ecoriornetrir: model, e.g.,  ihct Wharton moclel, the St. Lczui:; 
model. or' the Fed's FMF'  model, 1s  valid, then feedback ~~.ile..;  derived frorn rxntrol theory we 
siipesior-  to a constar::  rrinnetaiy grovdi.~-rate  rule. (See for instance, Corr;wali,  1955,  l.oveii arid 
{:)ri+sci;tt,  1968:  C(;o~ec  ail(j Fi:;cfler,  1 <;.j'd.:  Coc-j:,:ii  v  Sj';) ,+, P  .,c;, n'  ,I;::  n~~r!  '  Fric(jrg;;~r-:,  1 <I.j?i; 
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pei'ix, li~?>ii  ir.7  1975-ii,  fmnd  ihat the policy the "eci  i.l:.bd  actuaily followed ir;  tbi;at  perioi? 
was "slighrly better", than a stable monetary grcswti7-rate policy. which, in t~11-n.  perfoiinsd better 
than the Cooper-Fischer and Bronferibr'enner feedback rules. 
There was now finally some evidence for the Keynesian claim that, despite lags and 
forecast errors counter-cyclical policy can succeed.  But there were three major problems. 
First, the results were model specific, as well as time specific. Since the impact multipliers for 
monetary policy differ substantially among various models, it is by no means clear how much 
credence the just discussed results deserve. Brunner (1980, p. 53) argues that: "There is 
-.- -  .  zly  a;:t?n?pt:  i?urlny  L~F;  per-~od  ,-!ic':.lssd tl?   ass^::::  ?rlerjman's 8ci?al:en~- 
.  .  d:rt-.:tly  ;s,  :is  far  .  kriow,  s p;-:scr  (M;:yer,  1953) :ha:  rjpals pl.lmar.  w.  ::: 
1:  hi.  length ~75  ci1e  12g,  ki.1:.  does cl  1.;~  sore ,-:::*,her3  intc:  :hi  :;:im-cf  -x;s:  LZ:: -;.: 
::.zi.iiit;3:-1  21s  qr less 3::  aftc.~.  ;rlou:;ht  '  .  Zt surr,xr-;';ts  :)::L;  ;J  911.d  11  .-f 
-.  .  .  cyc-1  !,-a1  s~au:liza~:iri?  is  feasible. S;;bseq~,~;.l~t.  :.i:  pevlc~d  5i sci;s%~?  :le! r  : 
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::Gayer :94<:b, Ciiapter 5),  h:t:  ciiat.  attenpt  :73s rst 18~:ki  3  ,q:ll~e  1329aT.1.J;. 
7.c.:  _ .d.  i.:t Ian. substantial evidence that the optimal control settings are not robust with respect to variations 
over the spectrum of models." Indeed, all the models may lack sufficient accuracy (see 
Brunner, 1983). Not until 1988, when Bennett McCallum applied feedback rules to a wider 
variety of modeis, was the problem of model specificity ameliorated to some extent, although 
McCi&~rn's favorable results for his feedback rule aie open to  question. (See Benjamin 
Friedman, 1988.) 
The second problem is that sturdy standby cC  skeptics, the Lucas critique. It seems 
likely that the temporary demise that these feedback models experienced in tihe late 1970s 
,"  +  dui? fc. the L~rcas  ci.itiqi.ie. Third. except for the Craine, Haiienriet-  and Berry paper, tP:a 
control-model liter:rttiire only showed thal there is a pariicular discreiior~ary  morietary pr;!icy  ifrai 
THE POLITICAL ECONBRiW OF MONETARY POLICY 
The d~scussion  reviewed so far has treated the centtai bank as a perfectly obedient agent of a 
principal who has ~lilly  one aryurrlerlt in the utility function. economic stabilization. It also 
assumed that the central bank acts in a technically competent manner. using moaern 
econ~omic  theory instead of discredited doctrines. In doing so it ignored an important pan of the 
monetarists' case against counter-cyclical policy. When Milton Friedman described the issues 
about stabilization policy on which he disagreed with Franco Modigliani, one of them was: 
the assumption that if in fact you adopt a policy of accommodation [that is 
offsetting fluctuations in aggregate demand], Franco Modigliani will be twisting 
the dials. I have increasingly ... become impressed with the need for a positive 
science of politics. of political science. All of us ... have tended to follow the 
attitude: Well, now, what we need to do is to figure out the right thing. If only we 
can tell them what the right thing to do is. then there is no reason why able, well- 
meaning, well- intentioned people should not carry out those ideas. But we then 
discover over and over again, that well-intentioned, able people have passed 
laws, or have established institutions -- and lo and behold, they don't work the 
way able, well-intentioned people expected or believed they would work. And it 
isn't an accident that that happens. ... once you adopt a policy of accommodating to changes [in aggregate demandlthere will be all sorts of 
changes that ... [Modigliani] and I know sbould not be accommodated, with 
respect to which there will be enormous pressure to accommodate. ... I  have 
increasmgly moved to the position that the real argument for a steady rate of 
monetary growth is at least as much political as it is economic  (Modigliani and 
Friedman. 1977, pp. 17-18, emphasis added.)16 
Similarly, Karl Brunner (1981b. p  37) wrote that it is wrong to assume that: 'a  monetary 
authority will naturally pursue the optimal social benefit achievable with cleverly designed 
stabilization policies. ... They will have incentives to trade off degrees of achievable 
stabilization for political and personal benefits of various kinds." 
.  -. 
The Record of Monetary Policy ': 
Friedman and Schwa~ts  (1  963a) provided massive evidence on the pro-cyclical nature 
of Fed policy during the 1930s. (See also Elmus bv~cker,  1966).'%iit  one rnigh! respond that 
the Fed has learned from this experience. It now has the high employment goal mandated by 
the 1946 Employment Act, and is not likely to repeat the mistakes it made in the 1930s. 
Friedman and Schwartz end their story in 1960, and in their discussion of the 1950s they do 
point out that the Fed has moved away from its prior adherence to the real bills doctrine 
towards emphasizing the growth-rate of the money stock. With the money stock then growing 
at a very stable rate Friedman and Schwartz did not have much criticism of the Fed for its 
.  >  1'3:-  ci  31:91,31  ~t;~!;cm,er~t  CL  $2~  ;.:;r,l-s  yar.zy  see  Frierirzr,  [;93_3) 
i>ec'.-iuSe CJ~  -y l.:fifurt~~~?at.~  ~~~?L~Y~IICJF  3h~~i::  +-IT.+  ~LSCCTY  i>f  CJF:'~I-SL  b~i!~.klil~  .:I 
::,:,r.f  l-::e  ::rlc.  discg:;s i~r;:;  :p  ti  r:  L.  S  .  r3';'2>  CI;LII;:I  ;'3-5,  A  -..- 
'  :z! er 'L'emin's  d~iense  7.5 :.fie  Feci  iiciis  nrt  senv.  :X-?JLIICI:~.~;  see Kz'jez 
:  -  3.75  )  . . policy in the 1950s. Indeed, Friedman (1!360, p. 22) wroie: "Except for the sharp price rise in 
1950-51, our monetary experience since f 948 has been admirable by previous standards." '' 
To be sure, he did claim that even in the 1950s the actual record of monetary policy is inferior 
to that which a stable growth rate rule v~ould  have provided (Friedman. 1960, pp. 93-94). But. 
as he himself pointed out. he had analyxd  the record only in casual way that did not make 
explicit allowance for the lag of qonetary policy (Friedman, 1960, p.  97). 
Subsequent to the period discussed by Friedmail the Fed generated or at least 
accnrnrnodated ari inflation that between 'I  965 and 1982 saw the GDP deflator alrno:;t  triple. 
'To be sure. one mght arglie that lhis was r!oL  the fed's fauii, that this policy was iargel.y 
imposed !-)n ii by !he inte1iecti.A ar7d political c:jr.rer~ts  c?i the tirr~e  Gut f:sr  the purpose of 
~?~~;3i0;1lj1;k,j  (:<>;iril<:l  ~~(.:/~c,;;jl r)(>ji::;%;  it  <!i,j<?s  ,-j,:>[  !r;;yltif>r  ~v~j~\:.!~~<~~  !;-;:;  fIc;<,!  x,;j:\s ?i-!e  :j<j;~j;<:c?  <:j:  ~I:~~~:,:~,~. 
i}>c:  (;c>i.![ji,ii[  ~.;:;::,~:j~,yi;  !.>i.>!i(;;k?:;,  ,i\%  :;(:l:,;;',-;j  ;.:j?  ;ii<j<cl  .,..  rj::.>:  ,...<,.,  (,:'\  1  (.j<?.feti:;e <jf  F<;ci  i:<,  i!;:!\i  ~~!\;~,:.~i 
ef this inflation ces~.;iied  i'wrn ::I  poiii.;y  of accorr.i!n(.~:.ia;i:iij  s~pply  s}>ocks.  Had these si:::;ck:i  iioi. 
been accorrirnf.  dated they wwld have generated rnassive uriernpioyrnenf, so thht ttie Fed  ?.iR:i 
right  In  permitting high inflation. 
Although Bruriner and Meltzer devoted iess attention to monetary history than 
Friedman they, too, have criticized the Fed's record. pointing out that in the postwar period the 
growth rate of money has been pro-cyclical (Brunner and Meltzer, 19S3a, p. 97). But a pro- 
cyclical monetary growth rate is not necessarily inappropriate. One reason is that, given the lag 
of monetary policy it is possible that the monetary growth rate should rise faster during the 
expansion than during the recession.  Another is that since early in a recess~on  GDP is still 
above its trend-adjusted mean, while late in the expansion it is above its trend-adjusted mean, 
p:,wevpr  -we  i i,ie  ;,pays  :~ater  ,  i-1  ~~S,-;-~SC_~I~~:_:  3  ].;v~-,>T.  GV-4  P  -  . 
r  - 
L .  r 
2. :<cL p.-A  LLzl,  .5.52 LC Jr.:TD?: 
LC,.?'?,  F;riedi?:aii  :14[42j  argued  L:natr  :fie  ~.ri  hegar:  tz pay i!;rreasing  ll;  s~.:-~:l,-? 
11,  ,I.:  y~~n~f  hyx{  ac~~:~yr:c~a:es  +  - .;r::e?  ... ..  j2)-::  -..  ~'rli~  &,5  ,;b!:!r)(~e  its  -.  . 
J  -, effective stabilization does not mean raising GDP throughout the recession and lowering it 
throughout the expansion. (See Argy 19'79.) 
Looking at the record of U.S. monetary policy therefore provides perhaps some 
evidence. but certainly not compelling evidence that coiinter-cyclical policy cannot succeed: 
learning takes place. Fed policy during the last few years is a great improvement over earlier 
policy. To make a strong case against counter-cyclical policy requires showing that ihere are 
systemic factors that inhibit effective poli'cy-making  by central banks. 
The Monetarist View ctf Central Rank Behavior 
k':ih;:i? factors coirld prevent cefitral banks from  baiq  as effective c.:oirnter-c;yclical stabiiizer's 
as iheir ability to foser.:asr  aliows them to be''  One possitiility is that they are not free trj 
C[eter'7~l!i>:;'  tl!eir  r::;!:rl  policies. ,L\  secorlci i:.;  th:i:  thcv tt.?r!d  !c!  ailopt p:::;ii.;ie:;  tf);:lt :;e:ve  i!)cir ov:~ 
inter'sstl;. T'hir'ci. their i;oii(:ies  rmy  b5 ~ljb-~!;tir;~~l  d1.12  in :ii)Xie O"~C  i:~:.:jnitive  faili.ii~'<  that 
or.ganiratior7 theorists have ifisaissec! in their crrialyses oi other organizatiorls. for. exa~nple  tile 
problem of group-thrnk. Firrally, even oti-ierwise efficient policies can have bar.,  effects due tc; a 
coordination problem between the central bank and the public.2%~rietarists  have ra~sed  all of 
these issues. 
Friedman (1960, 1968) has argued that central banks are not free agents and that in 
case of serious conflicts with government policy, the government can get its way.  Brunner 
(1981a, p. 69), too, sees the central bank as placing the interests of its masters ahead of its 
stabilization task: "stabilization policies rank comparatively low among the interest of the 
clientele [of central banks] compared to the potential gains to be expected from allocative 
arrangements frequently pursued under the guise of monetary policy." He (Brunner ,1983) suggests that such a wish to accommodate their clients explains why central banks prefer to 
target interest rates. 
Here are some concerns raised by other monetarists. David Meiselman . 1986) finds 
evidence of a political business cycle after 1 %XI. David Fand (1  986) cites specific instances in 
which the Fed has succumbed to political influence. More generally, Robert Weintraub (1978) 
argues that presidents get the monetary policy they want, and shows that major changes in 
monetary policy were associated with the election of a president who had different views on 
monetary policy. He also shows that whenever' presidents with sharply different views ~)rl 
inonetary poiicy wel-i:  elected rnorietary pr:jlicy  changed. Althoi.~gh  these c~nclir:ii~r>tr;  are rir-i! 
frilly :iupp:,ried  by evenis s:ibser.!ireni  ir.? LA&il;tral.h's gaper his  exarrip1e:i  stiil make ail 
-: 
1;1jp:y2,  ,.. ,>>l'<ji?  :- ..  CXSF-?. 
R,<)ljg:r[ !-j<:?t;<<?;  (: $j[$G)  ;jr(l{.;~:;  ikj:jt  >-!  $i;jrl!f;(::;:3[;t  f(j;l;.:!j(;l;  <jf  ~~)<;fifi??:~:~  r)<jlli;y  j:;  :<> 
iedistritx~te  ir!ccxr!e by co!~tr'o!ling  ~r:'it?re.c;t  rates in x;r;orciance  v~itil  the? wishes c?i politicaliy 
puieriui  grotips who coi.ild threaren the Fed's I!-;depender;ce. lie  does not zla~rn  that this 
nece:;sarily  happens frequently. He claims only that at times this considera\~on  does inflcrence 
monetary policy. To maintain its freedom to respond to such pressures when this is necessary, 
the Fed is unwilling to set monetary targets it will adhere to. Hetzel argues that there is 
therefore a flaw in the basic Keynesian case for stabilization policy. This basic case is that due 
to long-term contracts the private sector is slow to adjust to changes in aggregate demand, 
while the public sector can respond quickly. But, says Hetzel (1986), the importance that the 
.  , 
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. .  , .  .r.o"erate  :rerrllic;  nhat  :  "Rar:he~-  than :  :rcIxde th,3t:  pr-s i~3en:s  Senera-  :;.  se:: ':i-::- 
-.  qanzt.zry p.,?ll,yy tllpy *:it,  it wr;.jlLd  2.2  r,r;:c  as.:c:;ra:.'  ':<J  say th;:~  3:;.\1- 
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:I-!: :~nql;el?tl~y  are pr?s~de~?t.s  ex-rfrnel~y  mhap~y  ~:ti-!  t.he  mcnet.sry  ~?l:cy '-'\-=;.  .... I 
q:?r  . " political system attaches to the distributional consequences of monetary policy eliminates 
much of the seeming flexibility of monetary policy. 
William Poole (1986) looks beyond the influence of politicians and argues that the 
public's pressure distorts monetary policy. The pcblic looks at only the currently pressing 
problem, and wants the fed  to focus on that. In periods of high imelrrployrnent it demands 
expansionary policies, and in periods of high inflation contractionary policies. Because of the 
lag in monetary policy such pressures push the Fed towards destabilizing policies. (See also 
L-ombra, 1988.) 
.  . 
hlany rrwnelarisrs rqect a popiilai- :;oIiition  to the problem of  political r?ressiires givirig 
cen:ral  barlks coris:itiitiurially  giiarariieed indeper~derice.  They argue ceotrai banks v~w.~lcl  thci.? 
i);:ii~e e$,/t?i1  r:)(:)r(:;  fff,:e(~(j;'[;  ft;;jr) r')rj\z<j  f(-)/i<j\,\j  t})(:)i:  :;f;lt-ir?te({>:;t,  :I!')(:/  ib'!~)i  [k?is I:.;  \j;<.;<)fl)~j::)~~~j\~? 
~hjitf!  :+ffpc[;~~e  st>jkj;/iz;jti<j;?  p(~li(;y  ~~~~i;;(jr~j:~!~  r;l;:jt.;<+:j  pii[<:);  :::1~1p[>;:\:;is  ~;~~\;~~jl  kj;jr;k:;  :.;<j:  ~~!:;~\~i;~~.~ 
a  bc'itom iine, XI  that ti?$?  pi~blic:  caiir;ot  r?ac.lily evaimte :heir perforinance. 
To show :ha:  the Fed follsws its om  interests Friedrnan (1982, 1986)  gwes several 
examples of Fed behavior that he believes can hest be explained that way. One is its 
reluctance to adopt serious monetary targets in place of rnoney-market-conditiorls targets. 
Friedman attributes this to monetary targets providing greater accountability. Another is the 
reluctance to adopt a fixed monetary growth-rate rule. something that would greatly reduce the 
importance and status of Fed policymakers. The third is the Fed's inflationary bias, which 
Friedman (1982), following Mark Toma, attributes to the Fed's gain from seigniorage. The 
fourth is the Fed's concern about keeping member banks from leaving the Federal Reserve 
System. because having many member banks enhances its prestige, power, importance and 
lobbying clout.22  Still another example is the Fed's open market churning, that is, its 
undertaking a great volume of open market operations that are soon reversed. Friedman attributes this to the Fed's wish to be seen as important. An additional example is the delay in 
releasing the Federal Open Market Committee's Directive on open market operations. He 
argued that by thus keeping financial markets in the dark the Fed enjoys a sense of 
importance, and also creates well-paid, private-sector job opportunities as Fed watchers for its 
staff.*" 
Moreover, both Brunner (1  980) and Friedman (I  986) raise a basic question . Why 
assume that. although agents in the private sactor a1.e driven by self-interest, in the public 
sector agents do riot try tr9 nmximize their om  welfare, but c~n~cienfioiisly  do  their principal's 
bidd~ncj') 
to curb dissent i,iithin its owi) rar!ks. Wiiiiar~)  Pcole (19%) argues that teci official::  are 
convinced that the Fed's independerm is essential. To protect this independence they rrlay 
therefore sometimes adopt policies that they know are not appropriate for stabilizing GDP. 
Despite the usual reluctance of mainstream economists to consider irrational behavior. 
monetarists devote substantial attention to the Fed's cognitive errors. In their Monetary History 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) discuss in much detail the damage done by the Fed's 
adherence to the discredited real bills doctrine. Perhaps this stubborn adherence results from 
a defect that Friedman (1986, p. 188) att,ributes  to central banks: that "an independent central 
bank will almost inevitably give undue emphasis to the point of view of bankers," which, he 
believes. induces then to confuse money and credit. Moreover, central banks are myopic. "If each case is considered on its merits, the wrong decision is likely to be made in a large fraction 
of the cases because decision-makers are examining only a limited area and are not taking 
into account the cumulative consequences of the policy as a whole." (Friedman, 1968, p. 192) 
Beyond this, the absence of a bottom line makes it hard for a central bank to learn from 
experience, and thus fosters bureaucratilc inertia. Examples of such inertia are adherence to 
the real bills doctrine, interest-rate pegging after World War If, and the system of lagged 
reserve 
Brunner arid Meltzer. like Friedman, pay rnuch atltentiori to the Fed's cogrii'live t?Sr.oi.s.  irl 
1964 they publisi~ed  a pathbreaking eval~satior~~  of tile:  Fed's thinking and proi:edr.lres  (Briini;t?!~ 
arid F,%?ltzer.  1964a and b)  'They found ~ltter  ccmfiision. 'The Fed tiad ;lis  c!ear  idea abixrt the 
pi.:~~;?:;s  ji:?3(jirtg  irc~r?!  ifs  C)p:?ri  r:l~>r.ket  o!;ri,ratior)s  it-, GC>i:) (that i:;  v/!-,ii Rril!:ner  ~li::  !::le!lzer. 
rievc:i;:pzrl  tr~e  tai.gels anc i;l:.fictitol.  at)pi:'jact!), s~iffe:i-,ti  fri;rt?) "moriey ri~arkei  ~?l~j~>~i;;:;'',  i!r-ici 
oite:! ivas corifi~seci  about w!'~e:trer  its pniicy W;~S  expa:li;ic?nary  or rastrictive. For exar:lple, I: 
described its policy  in  10tX as expansioi?ary, ever1 thoirgh it r'edwxd rnclrley and bank credit. 
Brunner and Meltzer built a strong case for belnevirlg that the Fed's strategy was so flawed by 
technical errors, that counter-cyclical policy was at least as likely to destabilize as stabilize 
GDP, 1 have the impression that many m'onetary economists, who previously had assumed 
that the Fed was professionally competent, were shocked by what Brunner and Meltzer had 
found. It is quite possible that even the Fed itself was shocked, because shortly thereafter it 
strengthened its research staff, and its economic analysis became more professional. (Brunner 
and Meltzer, 1983, p. 60) In addition, more professional economists, some with strong 
academic reputations, were appointed to the Board of Governors and to Reserve Bank 
presidencies. But according to Brunner (1983) these are largely superficial changes. Although the 
Fed rnay use the jargon and techniques of economic analysis it does not take economic 
analysis seriously. 'To  do so would be risky for it since economic analysis "injects a subtle 
constraint on the future range of possible actions," and thus poses a danger to the welfare of 
the Fed's bureaucracy. (Brirnner, 1983, p. 104). The Fed therefore prefers an eclectic positiorl 
that pr0vlde~  it with a greater range  for tailoring its explanation to any conclusion it wants  to 
reach. Brirnner argues that it is not alone in this. citing the Bank of England. the Bundesbank, 
the Belgian National Bank and the Banque de France as other exsrnples. Hence, although the 
Fed's  staff uses ec;onorr;eiric  models, the results shown by these inociels are frecjue:l!.iy 
served or\ the t-OR1C. 
Never once In rriy participation in nieetinys of the Federal Open Market 
Committee (FOMC) do I recall any discussion of iong range goals of econoln~c 
growth or desired price levels. It was like hying to construct a house without 
agreeing upon an architectural design. .... [Tlhe Federal Reserve is supposed 
to solve all sorts of problems, including inflation, unemployment, lagging real 
output growth, high interest rates, balance of payments disequilibrium, volatile 
exchange rates, depressed stock prices, a sagging housing industry, and the 
world debt crisis. ...  Imposing such a laundry list ... on the Fed reflects a total 
lack of understanding what the Federal Reserve is able or not to do. This kind of 
thinking hampers the workings of the FOMC. ... I recall no consensus on long- 
range goals nor do I recall serious efforts to set policy on any other than the 
shortest time horizons. ... I have always had the feeling that the discussion was 
"Where do you think the economy will be a year or two in the future, and how 
can we best set targets so that we won't have egg on our face if this doesn't 
come about? (Roos, 1986, pp. 772-5) 
In their study of the FOMC in the early 1970s  Raymond Lombra and Michael 
Moran (1980, p. 43) conclude that: "without the guidance or discipline offered by an analytic 
model and formal targets for nonfinancial variables, the formulation of monetary policy often seemed to be a seat-of-the-pants operation." In commenting on this study James Pierce (1980, 
p. &I),  a former senior FOMC economist (and not a monetarist), reports that: 
if the formation of monetary policy is to be understood and reformed, much 
more work needs to be done in developing an understanding of the group 
dynamics that produce the kind of FOMC performance described by Lombra 
and Moran. The members of the FOMC are basically intelligent people, and 
many have training in economics. They all have access to staff and outside 
advice. Yet wheg they get together we get policy  by "the seat-of-the-pants. 
Elsewhere, Lombra (1988) points out the difficulty that the FOMC faces in taking timely 
action, such as raising intorest rates wheri ~inernployrnent  is still high. Given the fragility of 
7-he results cf my ow!  sliidies of the Fed's thiriiting duririg the i973-75  recession ail:-!  viitk, 
Friedrnan ;  l %XI\  objects !(.I  :he  Fed frequently unpredictable changes in its policy, 
pres~rriably  because they  make ~t hard for the pubk  to coordinate its actlons, such as  price 
setting, with the Fed's policy. Brunner (1983). too, objects to the Fed's exacerbation of 
uncertainty. Moreover, Cukierman and Meltzer(1989) argue that central banks have an 
incentive to create uncertainty. The greater the uncertainty, the longer is the effectiveness of 
some policies, such as raising output by adopting a more expansionary policy. And keeping 
one's actions shrouded in mystery is also a good de~ense  against criticism. Brirnner (1  983) 
also refers in this connection to time-inconsistency. 
Evaluation 
These monetarist arguments obviously lack rigorous development, and some of them seem 
more like interesting issues for further research than carefully worked out conclusions."  It may seem that this is inevitable since neither the theory nor the empirical evidence required for a 
mGre convincing treatment is available. But this is not quite correct. Much work has been done 
outside the monetarist debate, and even outside of economics that monetarists could have 
cited 
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W3:-e~:-~~~jr,  retri~3n31--r:pec::a-~,:.;-.s t7as~.  ~CJZLII.C,::  p3lrtir:a:  ;3;1sln~?ti  :VT:-;::  >~:; 
.  w:_>.k  .-  ;  st-..^. 
.  ~  :vlayer,  1911 j,  .  it  tray see!r  Lila;  'b:e  ?3ss$bj-:;tj7  -f ~31  iti.i:.ii:  p_;;;:-:c.r:. 
..  ~  .  ,  cyc  ?.;s  La  irrzlevat;:  t.:!~ a Tijcc::ssiijn  ?f  CJ~!.,:?~~~L~-CJYC~.~L:,~~  p~jl:~y,  sir.:?  ~r: 
.  .  -. ,  .  . 
-,.I  -13-::pL:?,  pillL:c.&:  fil-:s:.r;i.s.;  f:\/c.les  -c:rl  :>c.,:~ir  even if  :i:e  ceri~ra:;  bariks  ,:,L,~-., 
.- -  .  , 
.:.:  ~;:rs,le  s co:;r!:.?:--cyr.;  :ral  p:  l i CT;,  2::  :,?fig  as i:  does ~ha;-.2e  the 'r~~~::;~t:+l.\,. 
~1..3.~~ti'  v.dfe  frL~,f,  'l!~?  !-il-;?  :-p  -  --.kc  - ..  L  2;.,--,-  Jur)t  c.5  i~culal  c'pa:;:;ps  i :1  xr,>li.,-.:  ..i  -.  -.  -1. 
E'.:': ::,unt:er-:;..~??;cz.:  :.I;:.?/,  ky gar.eca: izc EQ;?  ::,r,r-  c:entri.,i  Lanr,  z:t:  J7::~t.y: 
y;_i,<?:;  ]~i;  ';li;<,-:  ;.as:er'  :.>  i;lsc.  pq~~~i,..~:  k:ls.Lnes.;  cycles  i::g  !-+;KC  .L.-  .-  j1:~-.~.,:;:.,~.  2 '2  2 
thii  lik~l~hs~~d. 
YI~~c.~:,  :>tit  ric:  2f  it  i~i. rpprirlred  in ,'.jr;.a  and  T.or,a  (;,gq7) There is much less literature, other than the writings of monetarists themselves. on 
cognitive errors in monetary policy making. But there exists a large literature on the role of 
cognitive errors in other types of economic behavior, and that may perhaps be relevant for 
monetary policy.29  Finally, monetarists have paid some, but only limited attention to the one 
coordination problem of monetary policy that has received great attention, time-inconsistency 
It is possible that many 0,-  even rnost monetarists believe that polltical business cycles 
do not occur, are skeptical of much of the public choice literature on monetary policy and of the 
evidence on cognitive errors, and do not think that time-inconsistency is a serjoils problem. 
They rnay be right. So perhaps they sholi~ld  not be blamecl for not making greater. use of the 
literature on these topics. Bi!t where does this leave us'? Consider, for exampie, the iqqmthesis 
I'c:ci  jioli~i/-rr~;~kc;i's  ;ire  tx>tivaterl by r;c!f-ii?ier~;:,t A.i trines tli3t !d,/ili  ificl~ice  that12 ti:  ai:!  it: 
ways cogrrary tp tjli? p:lbjji  ij?terc;;st.  3s  Alijert i--lir~c$:~iar1  (r!-lc.z  tc:!-!iai.kec], pcj/icyn?aki::rs 
isave an incentive !o engage in obitiiary-enhancing behavior. By anci large, ttiat means 
engaging in socially desirable behavior. Clntieci~ssary  secrecy may enhance &e prestige of 
Fed governors. but so does the avoidance of recessions and inflation, The reach of the 
invisible hand is not confined to the private sector. 
Moreover, monetarists may well ble correct in saying that the Fed is subject to political 
pressures, attends to its own interests and makes cognitive errors. There is no doubt that such 
factors do degrade the quality of discretionary monetary policy. But how much? Do they just 
reduce the feasible degree of stabilization to a small extent, or do they cause discretionary 
policy to be destabilizing? Monetarists may claim the latter. but their evidence seems just as 
[Jsefu:  smrzes are 'I'ha'Ler  {l.'l'il and 13!J3:. Fo:  an  inter-estll-Ls  apylica:  ;c~:~,  .  .  of ~TJP~:  analysis ';a  cier-islan~ina;cl~l:;  ir:  ar~gth~r  ires of p:~bli,z  pclci.,  G-,  . 2.  C?  i C77: 
.  .  pnllcy, see Vertzberger  i1940)  Fcr an  ?,t_te1i1~pt  LG  apply r:cgnit.;ve  s~ss;!IIs:;:~ 
-.  t:k:r_.c;ry t;  monetal'y pollzy see  (Ma~er  199903, ,'hapter  16. consistent with the former.30  Here, as in the case of lags and forecast errors, they have raised 
a seriious challenge to a fundamental assumption of the Keynesian position, but that is all 
The Keynesian Response on Central Bank Behavior 
The Keynesian response (if that word is appropriate) to this challenge has been either to 
3  1  ignorfe  it, or to dismtss it with disdain.  This is illustrated by a Keynasian argument that was 
popular prior to the discovery of time-inconsistency. As Stanley Fischer (1990, p. 11  571, 
following Buiter (1  981  I),  tells us: 
At the formal level, Friednvm's analysis suffers froin the logical weakness that 
discretion seem  to dominate r~.iie:j:  if a particuhr rule vloilifl stabilize the 
ecanomy, then discretionary policy-makers could always behave that way -- anci 
retain the flexibility to change the ruie as rieecled. 
-- 
Rights.""  Friedman in a debate v~ith  Modigliani  stated  that his case for a rule is Saced "a! 
least 3s much" on political considerations as on  lays and forecast errors." (Modigliani and 
Friedman. 1987. p. 18) and has written vastly more on these political considerations than 
tnerely referring to the Bill of Rights. Yet the just cited footnote is the only mention of 
Friedman's political argument in Fischer's  survey of  "Rules versus Discretion in Monetary 
Policy". To be sure. Fischer devotes much space to the time-inconsistency argument for a 
:  say t):ey  ":nLlyU  rdtk:,?:-  :ndil  ';'lf:)'  ''&:jrr  be~d~l~p  dr: (;-;goner::  f'f  ;_'I.~::~-Y  -  A  ,-  L .~ 
-.\. 
-,  7 
.  ,cL-cal p~>-,?l~y  1-3s to ~hw  ;s  tha:  the effect:  r;f  t.9ese prshlerns  wi:?~;  ~?ijiki.ii~,l' 
-.  .  wl ;k  ~fi?  effect:: cf  idg~  ,211j fi._rer::i~t :;_rrcr.S  r'la;;.:  C:(>UI::ZT.  - r:yc  :1~31  pc?  ic.i, 
zat,ntzr-prcidu\z:  ive  . 
,-._  ,I pz'e  pay,  of cc>;r s;:  bf scr:.,.?  ~p).nesi>.;~s  ~rli  )i&~f.  =a]ceri tile  :!\rjnetar :  ;;-3' 
-1 
;lz'~LI.~,er-i:I  S?l  ~Cjl,I~-v.  ',  .  I 56  r~:  ciain? to i:av?  rea5 tl?e  er,-.ir?  1-r.erat.1.::-e.  3:: . : 
7 -  .,  .,  .  :he  i :  t  . cr: ;.s un-is~ial  dnd  rj7jt :>f tile  Ki.yr:es iar [::a i :istredrr:. 
As Br.>nfenbr;.nner  1146i,, p. ;'74  r  p!~t  it.  :  "Ti?.?  og~  iral dlscret  i.cnarji 
a;t?izrity  ica: 1 i:lrr~  Sliperxani  wllI,  d;w,%ys >ur_perfor.rn  xiy ruie l.L~,::irn  'hl~s 
. ,  a;s~:~ecicn.  . . .  Mak-nq a case agmrsr Si:p?r~i-;an 13 llke raking a lase a3airs- 
SC::;~?  C:L1~~.  .r5;3 firs'; question 1:s.  %Djr_';  vie  " overvalue the benefits of the Fed's autonomy, and hence to adopt policies that enhance its 
pciititA power, and to avoid policies that subject it to politically potent attacks. (Cf.  Kane. 
1990, Pierce, 1990, Willett and Keen, 1990.) Moreover, central bank officials, like all of us, are 
tempted to avoid the feeling of regret that comes from realizing that we have made a mistake, 
and hence may be slow to abandon mistaken policies. They are also likely to be excessively 
influenced by the views of their ~olleagcres.~~(~;ee  Klein, 1994; Mayer, 1990a) Consequently, it 
is not sufficient to say, as Modigliani (Modigriani and Friedrnan, 1977, p. 21) does, that: "I have 
yrerscnallp no reasrm to believe that the Llriited S:ates  government  ... is  not able to attract abie 
Uii;ti:ictiveiy  rnorietaris: poky  recc,rrirnericia!io;.:s stern less from theore~tical  or 
even empirical findings than from clistinc.tive vaiire jcidgments. The preferences 
revealeJ persistently in those recornmer~dations  are for rninimizing the public; 
sector and for paying a high cost in unemployment to stabilize prices. 
Similarly, Modigliani tells us that the dispute between monetarists and Keynesians on the need 
for stabilization policy is attributable not only to differences in empirical estimates, but 'Yo  no 
less a degree to differences in social philosophy and attitudes." (Modigliani, 1986, p. 7, 
emphasis in original.)"  Presumably Tobin and Modigliani  intend to imply that the monetarists' 
evidence on stabilization policy should therefore not be taken all that seriously. 
31..rzhpy!r.:,;rc  ,  pL-l  ir21/r,:aXel.g  1~ay  "j::  :  1 :;,3-ur;'.  g:,:aqgcr;.+  ..LLLA  -3,;  LLlc2&  '  2f Lk;f22~?  JW? 
an1 -:: ips, *::6 neric?  ;idcpr  pclic~es  ti-;it.  nr+ LX  rls:k;..  'rhejr  kave bexxe 
.\  *,  ?.  ,,,i:;i!raker:;  i-:?c.a,~s?  y):ey 3a-j..  bet.>  ;;ui:r-e~s:~;; y,L  pas';, part 3f tkic:~r 
-.  ~LC:C?:;S  %?is Q::%  t?  ..ICY,,  &Tart:  cl~~  :i:  iihiii:.~.  IE is cnly i-.at:~ral f,>:- pec,rlp  :  I 
1:  nr, ri;le  >f ].:j~k  drl,j cve~+;~il-a.;e  tklc  rgl?  -5  abiiif.j  -7-  ..I  -;,-.:  c.._~.  - 
s:1r_'t::s. 
.  .  ?+'~cdi,al.iani  appears t2  define "x~alsc.  71.ic-pe~t:;"  very brr;adly  tr,  ;I:,:  iu:ii_.  ;~;t.c;'- 
:?r.ven~ionaLly  wi.ulil ne ~alled  "pr-e  1  i~c'lirz"  or "presunp3si  tic>ns"  .  I  See 
P:;,:i:  :; :  idr::  a::d  F;':.i.ed~~ar  1 97.7, p .  ..0  1 It is hard to know what to make of this.. Friedman (1960, p. 85) in his discussion of a 
monetary rule does refer to his general preference for the rule of law over the rule of men, but 
does so only very briefly. Almost all of Friedman's discussion of the political aspects of a 
monetary ride deals with positive and not norn~dtive  considerations. 
A cynical interpretation of Tobin's and Modigliani's reference to value-judgments is that 
this Is a rhetorical argument (in the derogatory !sense of the term) running something like this: 
"We Keynesians are concerned about the welfare of ordinary people, and empathize wIth the 
poor. So we advoca:e  policies that will reduce irnemployrnent. Those who disagree with us  do 
so becair:ie they are less corii:er'ned  with the misery of  the unempioyeci. Vde  appeai tcs  tile 
r'eacfer, wi-lo no doubt shares oiir value judgment, to support oil; ~ositiusl,"  Birt there is no 
tl,-  ,n,2rj'ar.it  for sac? a i:y;lii:;al  iriferpretaiii;~: 
A mure plausible re:~i!inq  is  ti~:it. ;ls  cii;(;(rsseti bc/o!,i/.  i,d\o(.li<gli;3lji  and "roi;i!-: si!~:i~iy  do 
IX?~  i.rnderstar~rl  ~OLY  rn3rleta1'1sts  can disagree with their positive judgments. So,  they think ttiat 
the difference in policy recomr~lendatior~s  must be  dire to a difference in valut j~idgmcots  Arid 
there  IS a big ideological  distance between  Friedman, t%runner  and PJleltzer on the one tsarid. 
and Modigliani and Tobin on the other. 
OBJECTIONS TO A MONETARY GROWTH-RATE RULE 
Instead of trying  to meet directly the monetarists' challenge to their assumption about central 
bank behavior, Keynesians have followed the principle that the best defense is offense, and 
have devoted considerable effort to showing that a monetary growth-rate rate rule would not 
work One problem with a growth-rate rule is the difficulty of finding a measurable counterpart 
to the  theoretical term "money". Is it  M-1, M-2, M-3 or what? As Tobin (1  965) has remarked 
Friedman admits that he does not know what money is, but he wants whatever it is to grow at 
a fixed rate. Monetarists respond by saying that it does not matter all that much whether one 
picks b.4-1,  M-2 or M-3, since their growth rates are highly correlated. But, even in the period 
1959-1982 tne correlation is far from close. Subsequently, the correlation between the growth 
rate.s of M-1 and R1-2, as well as the correlation of tt,2 growth rates of M-1 with the grodh  rate 
of M-3 disappears. Only the growth rates of M-2 and M-3 are highly  orr related.^:' M~)rewer,  fke 
!:rii.iet~i  rneas;lres  of  M-7. M-2 arrd W1-3  are r;ot  the only possible measures or' irmney. and 
sorrie other measlire may be the appropriate one, 
2, +,:-:v~?$Kl::j[~:;  .  ;~;~:!.(~fi:::<;  3;ii!$>  ij<>f? ;.:I  q(yj(i ;:~<j\<fyl:+j;:  ;.i<p$)$t  ;.;  5k;jlfjie  {y:<j;le:3!y  {:r{;&.:r!;~  .  L' 
rate) fl.;!e, g!,.it ii !s  r'l(>&  ;!  v~]~i(~  ;lf;l[]!'~;e!jt  [(jr  ~;~(:;){~;(.~,;~(;\i~;;j~  r]:.>ii(;y,  'y'kl~: i:;e:r!!,.;3/  c)ar?k  <;<j\iici 
ai:kr:oivledge  that it does rmt have a?)  operatiowl defiriiiior~  of rnoriey, arid hence shifr 
occasionally (but not frequently)  in an ad hoc fashiorr between various measures oi  money. 
Or, t,crough this would not be acceptable to monetarists, it could use an interest rate or the 
growth rate of credit as its target variable, without attempting counter-cyctical policy 
The other problem with a monetary grovdh-rate rule is the familiar one that whichever 
measure of money is chosen. its velocity is likelv to be unstable, if not now, then sooner or 
later. When in the early 1980s the velocity of M-1 became erratic monetarists pointed to the stable velocity of M-2. But in the early 1990s that velocity, too, became unstable. Adding 
shares in mutual bond funds to M-2 helped for a time -- but not for long. 
But here, too, one needs to distinguish between a strict monetary growth-rate rule, and 
a moderate rule of abstaining from counter-cyclical policy, while adjusting the monetary growth 
rate for longer-run changes in velocity. The two key questions are again whether the central 
bank can predict cyclical changes in velocity and the effect of its policy actions with sufficient 
accuracy, and whether it can be trllsted with the power to adjust the monetary growth rate 
counter-cyclically. These questloris are not answered by pointing .to subslan!ial fl~uctuaiions  in 
velocity. Secular' changes in idelcxiiy anif in the appropriate measure of rrmney are only weak 
1961 bj  calculated the growth rate of money ttmt is optimal for price stability or1 the assumption 
that velocity is unaffected by the policy followed."  He then compared this optimal growth rate 
of money to (a) the actual growth rate that occurred under Fed discretion, (b) two versions of a 
stable monetary growth-rate rule, and (c) an adaptive rule that made the monetary growth rate 
a function of the prior year's  or quarter's increase in the labor force, labor productivity and 
change in velocity. Bronfenbrenner's  results with quarterly data  (though not those with yearly 
data) favored the adaptive rule. 
Modigliani (1  964) criticized Bronfenbrenner's assumptions that velocity is unaffected by 
the growth rate of money, and that mone,y affects income without a significant lag. However. 
<.  ?r~.  ..2c~  .  ,  !>~lf  r~i;:  p::~  1  :-?;\T  ;~-:31:::-5lt\:;:j  .  3:[:i..:  r:le  ~.yltl.;?L bdr:lc  cax?nc.t_  . _  ,  r .  ;:.'::  -  - 
3wa-y  whet-he-  3  ;.r.a!-.qe  in 17elicit.y is cycilcal ,J:-  sec:~lal,  it i~:  :-0'7-  .  ,-LLq:Lla  '--  frc'r- 
?esp;r.di:;;j  t,:  wila~  it -,?i;.r:ks  :!re  o~l-~-  . (--jciica:  A  c)lar,qcs  it wi i ter:j  t.2 be  Id)_,- 
IF  resgcnding -:c sec.~inr  ,changes. 
kc;  4r::jr  17+71.  5ij.rlts (;I:,  this ;s 3  str,2ricj  assclinptr>n. Modigliani assumed that the effect of money on income occurred within half a year, an 
assumption that is both critical to his results and open to question. (See Attiyeh, 1966; Mayer. 
1967). Moreover, Attiyeh (1966) pointed out that Modigliani ignored the lagged effects of 
monetary policy, as well as Okun's law. On the other hand, in a subsequent paper designed to 
deal with these problems, McPheters and Redrnan (1975) found that discretionary policy was 
on the whole superior to a fixed monetary growth-rate rule, or to a rule that put limits on the 
Vic!or  Atcgy (1979)  In a sornewt-iat sirnila,i' st~rciy  of seven coi:r~iries  took residiiali; from ti 
stable growth trend of rnoney and, using an econometric estimate of the lag. caiccilrited their 
impact on industrial production. On the whole, his results showed that departures of rnurley 
gro~vth  from its trend destabilized industrial production. In another test for eight countries he 
looked at the effect of money growth on velocity, and again found discretionary policy to be 
destabilizing. However, both tests require the strong assumption that money is exogenous, as 
well as the acceptance of Argy's estimate of the lag. Argy attributed the poor performance of 
discretionary policy to political pressures on the central banks, and to their focus on goals 
other than stabi~ization.~" 
Another test is to see whether GDP grew at a stabler rate in those periods in which the 
monetary growth rate was fairly stable. Modigl~ani  (1986) found that in two postwar periods when the U.S. money supply was growing at a relatively stable rate, GDP was highly unstable, 
though in a third period of relatively stable monetary growth, GDP was also growing at a stable 
rate. From this Modigliani (1  986, p. 37) concluded that stable money growth is neither a 
necessary nor a sufficient condition for economic stability. There are two problems with this 
conclusion. First. there is the question whether lone should look at periods when the growth 
rate of money was stable, or as Fiiedman (Friedman and Modigliani, 1977) maintains, at 
periods when the growth rate of money was changing at a stable rate."  Second, given the 
Fed's tendency to accorrirrlodate changes in the demand For  money one woiild expect mmey 
g1.0~vt.7 f~;  he more erratic at times when GDP cjrovAh is more c:r.rat!c: 
in :j somswbat similar test Star'leaf and FYioycl  (1  972)  campared  the relative stability Gi 
.  . 
r?j(]~>el:jy  ~~~c>v~(~~  i-Fjifj:j  ;:>f:rj  [<f:.>ilj  j:;  tb~irtcje~)  <;(>I.:o[s~::>s  r/)e\r ~h<>~hj($(.i   PI:^:  f:(~~.i~)!~j~?~;  !:;!;!;  :.: 
siabler rrmney  grocvlh rate a!:x  t-l:ld  stabler. C;DP cjro:~~iit>.  However, ii is  riot i;ieai i;:i~e!ii;;i 
~.in:;iaisIs  money growth C%IIIS~(~  ~.ins!able  (XI!::  grovdh, Or ~:mverse. 
Using an (apparently indepenrlent1.y  developed) framework similar to Friedman's (1  953) 
Robert Fix and Charles Silvesind (1  978) looked at tile correlation between changes in velocity 
and changes in the monetary growth rate in a sample of countries. They compared the actual 
changes in money growth to the changes that would have been appropriate, given the 
correlation between changes in velocity and money. They found substantial variation among 
countries; in particular the U.S. experience was not representative. Their results generally 
suppclrt discretionary policy. However, they had to make the strong assumption that the 
observed changes in velocity are independent of changes in the monetary growth rate. 
Fr:-ed:c!drl' .l  ar::urxerjt  1s tk:;:t  ry.zt:s;cr-,c.  -  -  ,:,:f:i~z-  vi:i.~r. rnr~r;~)~  2s qrsk:r.q  d~  2, 
slc~wt-  1-,3~e  t.i?an rihe  pul=l;c  ?xpecKs, 3nd  ,:iiat  t.ne  prlciii:  fr~rn.: 1t.s 
z;,:p~~t;:tl0ns  ~-pcjrec-<-  -  T-  ucL/.  .I.  Tibia  (1993,  p.  508) alsp :!rcjues  tt:kt  frcr::  1-15i; 
:117:11  13'73, s "re-nazkably  st:ahlel'  pex~r?d  :he  E'ed  was ''7~ague,  resg'2nsive  ?r2 
3crlr.e.  "  But  if  wc1.l  so &  :;r~  11- tf!e  ~'j~~~~~p:,-:it  1~5~.  ~.j",:i~~f!j:  p,\?.jqij. Another test of counter-cyclical monetary and fiscal policy jointly is to compare the 
stability of the U.S. economy in the postwar period, when stabilization policy was used, with its 
stability before 1929.(See, for instance Modigliani, 1977, and Heller in Friedman and Heller. 
1969.)  Such a test iis not persuasive because the postwar economy differs from the pre-1929 
economy also in many other ways. Thus, Keynesians should expect greater stability because 
of the greater relative size of the governmental sector and the prevalence of autorr~atic 
stabilizers, while monetarists shouid expect greater stability because of the avoidance of the 
nlassive hank failures that used to accompany many major rec~tssions,'~ 
HI! in all. th~se  empirical tests do no:  provide nxmetarists with the evidence ikey i:eed 
t~  rriake strong ciairns. nor cic? they provide Keynesian with a ~i~stifmtior:  for  rejecting the 
r;io~:i:ta!.i:l~t  p~s~tiot~ 
RECENT UE!!E1_13P;JEN'TS 
lr:  recent years the debate has beer! swep:  Lip  ir! the cc..rliroversv  abo~ii  new r:iassii.:ai  t?;t?ory 
New classical  :conorr.risis have reached the same policy conclusion as hard-core ri~onetarists, 
but have done so f,or a vely different reason, the rapid and efficient response of the private 
sector to changes in aggregate dernand, and not the slow and inefficient response of the 
public sector. It ha!;  also been substantially chancjed by two other developments. One is the 
irnpolrtance that many economists now attribute to the danger of time-inconsistency. The other 
is the erratic behawior of both velocity and the demand for money. These two developments 
have lead to a focus on a compromise position; the use of feedback rules. Feedback rules 
represent a compromise accepted by some monetarists, such as Meltrer (1  987), but not by 
others, such as Friedman. Such rules represent an obvious adaptation of  monetarist to the 
brute fact that velocity is no longer stable.  It  is compatible with their distrust of central banks. and with their belief that we lack the knowledge required for effective counter-cyclical policy. At 
the same time, feedback rules also have some appeal for  others because by constraining 
central banks they avoid the time-inconsistency problem. 
That does not mean, of course, that the debate is over. Presumably many, perhaps 
rnost Keynesians prefer an entirely discretiona~y  monetary policy. Thus two leading 
Keynesians, Benjamin Friedman (1  988) and Modigliani (1  988) have questioned the case far 
feedinack rules. All the same, there now exists a coherent compromise position. 
WHAT WENT WRONG? 
-~p.  ~t?  :.hree fail~:ses  that crccurreci in the debate cart rww be surnrnasized. First, a false 
dicho'rorny was poseti.  instead of asking the broad question whether a fixed gso~vtlw~jte  rxie i::; 
prefr:(ilbi%:;  to ali iypt-ts c;i  ijis;(;relk)flL~!'y  rncjiieiar-;  pOiicy, two clistinct qr.:e.;iions  si!o:iid  havc 
beer) poseid, (me ah!-i!  the v:]i!ic,ji!y  of th.  i-ica~l  irlr;i>etari:;i posilior~,  r~r'ici i;;e se(:o:?:i  ai-jo;.$i  ti-)? 
idal!rl~tgl  of  ?he  rnociera:e  pssition. 
'The set;orid  failure was that many monetarists overstated their case, in part, by treating 
evidttnce for their moderate position as ttiough it were evidence for their hard position. They 
also treated a possibility argument -- or perhaps one should say a plausibility argument -- 
about lags and forecast errors as though it were much more conclusive than it actually is. 
Similarly, they did not develop their political argument against discretionary monetary policy 
sufficiently. They did present a serious challenge to the naive view of the central-bank as a 
good and wise deus ex machina, but then jumped to the conclusion that it behaves more like 
either a  dunce or Satan.  heir evidence that various factors inhibit rational and socially 
efficient central bank behavior fails to show that these factors prevent discretionary monetary 
policy from doing  good on average. And their historical evidence of central bank failings. if interpreted as more than a suggestive argument, is open to the objection that learning takes 
place. 
The third failing of the debate is that the Keynesians did not treat sufficiently seriously 
the e'vidence presented by their opponents. They ignored Friedman's fundamental contribution 
of treating the stabilization problem as a problem in minimizing the sum of two variances. They 
also brushed aside the monetarists' skepticism about the motivation of central banks, despite 
the evidence that the monetarists and public-choice economists had provided for it. To be 
sure. by writing as tho~~gh  a fixed monetary growth-rate rule were the uniy alternative 20  a 
counter-cyciica1 yoiicy, r-rmnetarisfs made  ii ternpiing for  Keynesiarls to criticize such a wl? 
instead of adrir.essing th? serious qirestio:ls about the s:atiis  of  their basic asscirr-;ption.c,.  Bi.it 
K6:s/!)i?::,i:fjr;s  ::;::::;\.!;(j  l.;:l~lc? r(:sisfc;($  ic?r]jf>[;ii\(>;, 
,  . 
:  ,  i,i2:;  ,,.,;,y;ve  .-.....  jr  pj?;!:, [..cj~(j  ~~~j~~~?~~  vjbj<>  cj>i!lj tkl;.;j  ;;  /.,;j!!-tii,jif;  !cr  :j  ~<><.)(j  sj\(;g, :<.!  ~j~~;;~~~  :3 
cio~ma  with. If $0.  the  ixe!- staterjierlts of !tie  mon2ta:ists perhaps tiese:ve sc.?r';ie 
undersranding. Zu:  they  surely did rmt contribute to the acivance of kncswleclge. Ail ;r;  ail, boti-I 
sides ciain?  to possess knowledge they do not have. 
RELATION TO PLILOSOPHY  OF SCIENCE 
In eva~luating  this debate I have not made use of  varioirs philosophies of science because they 
deal with more sophisticated issues than the ones that have hobbled this debate. But it is 
useful to see if  the way it has proceeded has any implications for the relation of  philosophy of 
science to economics. 
My evaluation supports falsificationism, albeit in a weak and indirect way.. A major 
criticism of falsificationism is that it is prescriptive and  not a good description of what scientists 
actually do.. But that is a problem only  when it is applied to sciences that are successful 
enough for the philosopher-critic to have relatively little to contribute. The debate about the mon'etary growth-rate rule has not been so successful. Regardless of  the epistemological 
status of falsificationism, a whiff  of falsificationism would have improved  this debate.  While 
neither of the rival hypotheses could have been  compellingly falsified, more empirical testing 
would  have been useful. Moreover,  a Popperian mind-set, particularly if it were what Boland 
(199'4)  calls the Socratic version of Popperianism,  ~vo~rld  have made economists on both 
sides more aware of the precariousness of their positions. In particular. it might have induced 
Keynesians to ask  whether their assumptions .about tho ceritral banks' information set and 
motives are valid.  lt might also have induced rrmietarists to  realize that much of  theis case 
consists of  possibility arguments. To he :;!ire.  sirct-i a cleveloprnent woiiid  nc?t have required 
falsifc.ationism, but emphasis on  falsificatioriisrr; wcx.~ld  have rriade it rr'i~re  likely. Iri acaderrx? 
I! <j?t~??-l  fa+k?s  ~1 s~~:~r:~.-st>~~~~i~;l  tc;  (.lo wl?;)! {.:::>LII(I,  ir!  ;>rir;c:!;.;!:;,  bc:  d<.~:.~e  jtis! as weil ~vit!-i  ::I  sp:2de, 
A  Kiiilniarl i;;t,tir.preia!io?.;  csf  !tie debate v./i:!ri(.i  !lave littie to coritribiite..  -[c:  he sirra, cri 
?he  ~SS\IS?  of  ci-?ri!~'::~l  barlk beimii~)s  there seem  to he  soineitiiixj that resembles a Ktihr~ian 
irw~r'i.iprehension  of the other sides' position,  but tt~e  resemblarice is  far from close. Hoih 
s~cles  agree on what the question is, arid would look at essentially the same evidence if it were 
available. The difference is that monetarists judge central bank misbehavior  to be  a major 
problem,  while Keynesians judge it to be  a minor problem, and both sides are puzzled by the 
side's judgment. On the issue of lags and forecast errors there is no sigrl of paradigmic 
differlences. Suppose for example, that a new econometric model would predict GDP 
extremely accurately. Then, despite the previously-discussed difference between predicting 
GDP and  predicting  the effects of policy actions, it is likely that many monetarists would 
concede that the Fed now has the skills needed for effective counter-cyclical policy. 
Conversely, if  forecasts were to deteriorate substan
4ially in the future,  at least some 
Keymsians would shift in a monetarist direction, as they would if the Fed were to blunder again as it did in the 1930s. Both sides look at the same evidence. albeit through different 
glasses. 
Lakatosian methodology fits at most only slightly better. If one formulates the debate in 
Lakatosian terms one would say that for Keynesians the hard-core propositions are  that 
central bankers are capable and dedicated to their stabilization task, and that they can forecast 
with r;ufficient  accuracy.43  Disputes about such issues as the length of the lag, and the reason 
the Fed targets money market conditions, or its abiliry to control money growth are disputes in 
the protec!~ve  belt. But such a Lakatosian formulation is not insightful. The words are right, b~it 
the rnusic is oiit of  ti~a~e.  The debate about protectiiicl:-bei.bt-I  propositions seerns s'I~irlteci,  or  else 
related to marly other ~SSL~~S  than a stable rnonetaay grodh-rate iiiie. Supposedly hard-core 
pi".,~:)sitir;ns  as<.:  oiten attacked or' iicf5ridei.i ciirec::tiy, s:j  ib~a'i  !ilt?  r{istii>ctic.~r~  beb;!eeii  the? i..:arl!,i 
3r1d  !.he pio[e:;.tiije be/?  i:;  [lot $alien:. 'Tile &~rni:,l<l?l  ;:;  ti):it  ii  ti:e  !_cjkai13sian  (.:oi.]i:ej.)t  oi 
research pl.ograir!s fits anything .  ii is  rno!.e likely ;o be the entire ~ricmeiar'is!  and Keyilesiai; 
programs.  or better still,  neoclassical econoriiics as a whole,  rather than jiist positions on a 
stable rrionetary gso~uttv-sate  rule. 
Siiperficially the debate seems to fit the Hegelian schema, vdith the Keynesian thesis 
and the monetarist antithesis giving rise to the synthesis of feedback-rules. But it is far from 
obvious that feedback rules are widely enough accepted, and that they will survive the ongoing 
dispute long enough to be considered a synthesis. Moreover, the driving force behind them 
was not so much an intellectual development as an outside factor, the instability of velocity in 
recent years. 
-  L  . .  ,-:,a-,7  ???IT,  s-ra~?ce  t:ri  :a11  a ii;;p~:.h~sLy ahou:  the Xei;avii?r-  of  -.--'  -c..~  :-21 
5,::rlkc.r  a  i:ald  ~ ii,rp pr3pc.1  j.t ;ST.,  Bet  ';he  %npcr  ta5.l~  of xe.r:es'  pwrl f2ltrl :  :, 
t.he  zp.?dwili  3r.d  atjility of ar int.ell?ct:~al  cpvelr~ing  class f:zr~zer'l  ar 
?  -~  1 y~ppye:r!t  payt  r:f  2:  pc:;:  i ::!l  T::.~T,+J:;.  8  ar  :'  llarlnari ?rid  Wagrler,  19-17, ap  . 
,  . 
78-31.;  II? the L.S.  same  exinc!:t_  I:ev~et;i.rrs seer ti?  take ;i  :?c:newi-at. sln::il. 
F'3.I ?  t  :La?.  . Quite apart from the philosophies of science just discussed,  as  a description of 
prevailing practice,  this debate unfortunately provides some support for a moderate 
constructionist view, closer to what MBki (1992) calls the ethnographic version than to the 
Edinburgh version. That adherents to the dominant paradigm ignored the questions which 
monetarists were raising shows how in this case knowledge was socially constructed, in the 
sense that it was considered ac
c
eptable to ignore relevant information. It is likely that the 
disposition to ignore the monetarist challenge had something to do with the tendency of rriariy 
major  U.S.  econoniics departrrierlts to employ no. or'alniost no Chicago graduates. who tend 
to cor\gregate in a rn~nority  of  cfepar-trrienis.  The rnonetar.isi chailenge is  thei-iifnre surr:et.!:iri!; 
that cne might -- or rrlighi iloi  -- read about, but  not  have to face on a day-tc?-day basis. 
Stie y:q x;ailen!ji;  r:e:~:;o!.{t(;  are c::jrl:;tri.;c[e:'i  fll::>y  i4ve]i  ;-1Ftr2ct  ii;e v./:lij  cccsrigrvi::s  is 
i;i.j~i~tr'il~t~'(~. 
To  be sure, one night respond that it is not ki~o~viedge  per se. but only the "knowiecige" 
r nores  of a particular group that is here socially constr~icted;  that when one group of scientists id 
important evidence, another group will briny thizi evidence into the open. This did happen here. 
But was it inevitable? Suppose that Friedman had become, shy a statisticlan instead of an 
economist, that Karl Brunner had not received the fellowship that allowed him to come to the 
Cowles Commission at Chicago, and that Allan Meltzer would therefore have studied with 
someone else. Would there have been a thriving monetarist school to challenge the implicit 
Keynesian assumptions? One can respond that the points made by these monetarists were 
out there waiting to be discovered, if not by them. then by others. (Cf. Maki. 1992.) Self- 
interest impels economists to search for undervalued arguments. But if they had been 
discovered and advocated by economists less gifted than the three just mentioned, and in 
particular if these others had lacked the persuasive skills of Friedman, would many people now know about it? I believe that eventually  the monetarist challenge would have to come into its 
OVVI~,  but eventually is a long time. 
WHY DID THIS DEBATE GO SO BADLY? 
One can only speculate about the reasons why the debate was not more productive. The first 
failure, asking too broad a question, is probably related to the vehemence of the general 
monetarist debate. Mussa (1  994, pp. 138-39) refers to it as  "fundamentally a religious 
contiroversy, intrinsically related to the age-old dispute over free will versus predestination." 
f:)ierce (1  995, pr:.  CK?  and  30) also calls  the overali monetarist-Keyr~esian  debate "iai'gely a 
~t?lirjic>iis  debate." ai;d !ei'ers  to "a singiilar ~isiwiiiingr~esss  for li~a  pi'opments  or;  either sids ro 
iis!eiJ io tile prtip~;~iiii?r;s  of the other." 
i.1 i!!i.?-!,  [i:..  t,f;i!e;.1;:::lce c>f  :tic? &i.,ate  1.riny  be tili;l  suinc cxier.ii  {s  i;ic!;]i:;gica  f;~,:t<:;:, 
ilic$[  ,:>  !c>  [f:~  <-~~):(;~i(,J;j  ~t;pi<.>:>:  :;]);!~~j!~~  '  .Y  <j;:-;;:~~j!'t~':;;r\g  \'/:[!.I  ,..):!)s!'  e::(Jj)~j;[:i:jt$  s<~  rTl:;\riy  i:).;iie;s. 
aric!: 'hat Friedrnan being so str'c?r!c]ly  !rier\tified  with :jri..l>i?~i;.j~ttd  free market view:;.  Is  :his 
c.:ornkination  OF  moi-letarisrn and a siron;;  belief 1r1 free rnariiets an accident of history as Tobir! 
(1981) suggests? Surely, one can believe that the lag of rnorletary policy is long and variable. 
and Ihat our ability to forecast and to predict the effect of monetary policy is limited, without 
opposing the welfare state. One can also accept the monetarist argument about pditical 
pressures on central banks and about their inefficiencies and self-interested behavior, and yet 
subscribe to a "progressive" political philosophy. That is true in principle. But those who 
consider the government benevolent and efficient enough to remedy various market failures 
are likely to believe that it can also remedy that great market failure. unemployment. Similarly, 
those who question the ability and benevolence of the government in general, are not likely to 
see the central bank as able and benevolent. Much of the dogmatism shown in this debate may therefore be ascribed to its political nature, thus illustrating the difficulty of doing 
"scientific" work on a politically charged topic. 
Apart from the vehemence of the debate,  professional rivalries may also have made 
the leaders on both sides disinclined to look for a compromise that would have separated the 
hard monetarist position from the moderate one. Neither side had all that much of an incentive 
to look for such a compromise. Kcynesians, being in the majority, had little incentive since if 
the debate focused on the moderate monetarist position, ihere was at least some danger that 
they ~muld  lose th?ir majority status. A fixed monetary growth rate. corrle what may, is a miici> 
rwre  irwiting !ar.get to attack than is a policy sf eschewir!g  coiirrter-cyciical policy  Aod unti! 
velocity bscame highly iinstahie ir!  the early 19;30s, rrionetarists rr'iay have lacked the ini:er-iiivc 
to :;ire~ii;ti'ier?  their i:xe  agai:?:;t  c;oi,irl!e~.-:,:yci!cai policy at the cxpen:;e  of  tveake;.r-iinc_l  ?lei:. ca..:.i 
ayairlst cilar~gir;g  thr3  i.r.!o!leiai.;  gro~l,<k!  (a:'+ ili !i::s;:c>;:sa.  (0  sec;ijlal  c;har;ge:;  ir) veir;city. 'li.it:'.; 
may have heerr afr-niri  tilat ii the central isarik is nlic.l:ve:~  any discretion ai all it wilt 
si~rr'eptitiously  follow counter-qciical plic:ies. 
The secorid lapse from good practice, the monetarists' overstaternert of their case, is 
not ail that an imusual a lapse, and not only in economics. In his Treatise on Probab~iify 
Keynes (1  921, p. 427) tells us: "In writing a book of this kind the author must, if he is to put his 
point of view clearly, pretend sometimes to a little more conviction than he feels. He must give 
his own argument a chance, so to speak, not be too ready to depress its vitality with a wet 
cloud of doubt."  It should not be difficult to find examples of overstatements even in the most 
respectable sciences. All the same, the fewer the better, and monetarists certainly deserve to 
be criticized for their overstatements. 
The third lapse, the Keynesians' dogmatic disregard of the monetarists' evidence, is 
due, in part, to the politicization of the debate. It is also due. in part, to the monetarists challenging, not some technical issue in Keynesian theory, but something in which Keynesians 
take great pride, the ability to reduce unemployment and thus prevent much misery. At the risk 
of engaging in psycho-babble, it seems  that it may  also be due to a fundamental 
metatphysical belief shared by many Keynesians: that with sufficient goodwill and intelligerxe it 
must be possible to reduce human 
Another possible reason is that, as already discussed. many Keynesians may not have 
taken the monetarists' suspicions of the Fed seriourly. Vdhat we may have here IS an inability 
or reluctance to understand the o;ponent's  paradignl. The public-choice view of government, 
which monetarists generally adhere to, and the pub!ic-interest view, which many Keynesians 
adhere tc,,  are different "visions". As David Colander  (4  994a and b) has stressed, econornisk 
rc.l;t(-  ,,,_,-.1i3nt tci c(;nfruri!  differen!;es  iii vrsion. 
(;olancjer  ( 1 Qg..$cj  acid bj alscr  discilsses ti-1~  lisefiii  disiinctjol-1  betwpei-l t}-jc  :;~isfic.e  0: 
C~:~~~CI~TI~CS  and the art of esoi>un~ics.  the latter xlciing to econcimiz hypotheses certai!? 
hypothes!?~  frorn other fields, sacii as politics or- public sdministration, that are 1:erdsd  io make 
policy recommendations. Economists feel uneasy about discussing the art of economics 
because  they canriot do so with the degree of rigor  to which they pretend. So they 
concentrate  their discussion on  the  "science"  part of the argument. But this is usually of little 
general interest, and most economists do want to deal with matters of widespread interest. To 
avoid this dilemma they act  as though the  strength of an argument is as strong as its 
strongest link, and hence as though only the science of economics  matters. (See  Mayer, 
1993.)  With resped to the "art" part of the argument,  they behave as there were a minimum standard of rigor, and  that on any issue that cannot be treated with that degree of rigor. all is 
lost, and one person's opinions are as good as another's. Hence, they are tempted to 
disregard the art statements of those they disagree with as though they were mere asides. But 
that means sweepilng problematic assumptions under the rig,  and pretending to more 
knowledge than one possesses. 
That may also explain why neither side made much, if any, use of the political-science 
litera.ture  dealing with the Fed and with bureaucratic behavior in general. This  sort of 
parochialism is common in economics. (See Hairsrnan 1992.)  Ati alternative axplanation is 
that !his liter'c?tiir'e  does not provide enot!gti strcngly mnfirrneii  propositions. Hut if  politi~al- 
scierice propositions are a necessary part of the argument, then aha! is less of a jusiificatioi.~  ic;r 
igcai;ny :./!?a:  i:;  r:ivailabik  ir:  ths poiit~c<-~l-scierici:!  literature thau for  expressin{] orle's 
~;<jr~~;!~.i~~~jrls  yjitt-I /];:r~!i:j{~y 
The pr'cfcssiol!':;  great enipi~casis  on the applicatiosi of  sophisticated teci!niqi.ies 
probably also  played  a part.  Ceritral bank behavior 1s  an issue that is best sti~diecl  by looking 
at  specific  events using tools more akin to those of the historian than those of the 
mathematician. Few economists are willing to do that type of work. 
Still another reason why Keynesians did not attend  adequately to the monetarist 
challenge may be the way monetarists presented their argument. Had they presented it 
explicitly as a challenge to Keynesians to bring into the open and to justify their implicit 
assu~mptions  about the central banks' ability to predict and its motivation,  the debate might 
have been more productive. Instead, by putting their argument in terms of the desirability of a 
monetary rule, they presented Keynesians with a much easier target than having to discuss 
their own assumptions. It is much easier to criticize Friedman's rule (see Lerner. 1962; 
Goldfeld, 1982; Tobin, 1983) than directly to justify the Keynesian assumptions. Finally, both monetarists and Keynesians claimed more knowledge than they 
possessed because! they were addressing not only a professional audience. but also 
policymakers and the politically aware public. Friedman's main statement of his position 
(Friedman. 1960) originated in  series of lectures he gave to a general audience, while 
Keynesians advocated their position in many popular magazines and in congressional 
testimony. Such audiences are used to overstatements and indeed would not be moved by 
arguments that stact with: "we don't really know. but it seems likely to me that  ... ." Policy 
debate:;  foster overstatements;  economists who say "on the one hand.  ... but on the other 
hand  are not  pcpiilw'". 
iN CBNClLl$tBN 
/!+!I  jii  ::tii,  scoi;oi-rlist:;  cannot fsei /;rcj~~:j of the debate ai;out tI7.s  ri1onetar-y ;!p~~j~[l~--r;it:::  iwi,::.  k3t.i: 
~)~>f~>~<;  ;~!~,Z~IIC;  :jr)  O[<.~E;I.  f(>( :>;~(:~C/C)~I?  ~l?d  ,I!;:,;?s  0r.i~:  ~~'~~~~i~~j  c~~fi~l:!~~~  [bi~!~  if)i!)gs. fz~r:;{ it is 
precisely  tt~is  type ot topic that is likely to generate ail ~;r.isatisfactoty  debate, ~n  part becaii:.,,;. 
of its high art component, and in part because i!  engages political sympathies so strongly  The 
diff~cl;lty  of bringing empirical evidence to bear rniist also have contributed to the low quality of 
the debate. Other aspects of the overall monetarist debate, such as the debate about the 
behavior of velocity, or about the St. Louis model. are much closer to meeting the standards of 
good conversation. It might be useful to see to what extent other debates that engage political 
attitudes, such as the debate between the two Cambridge's, and the debate about the 
appropriate level of unemployment benefits.  fail  to measure up to reasonable standards. Second, as Feyerabend has taught us, even in the physical sciences debates do not 
always conform to idealized notions of "science"."  It would be interesting to see if in the 
natural sciences those debates that challenge basic presuppositions are conducted all that 
much better than the debate reviewed here. A study of controversies in fields like medicine 
might. also throw some light on whether it is common for debates that question the ability to do 
good tend to be par.ticularly vehement. 
Third, despite all the roadblocks the disctrssion has advanced. The avoidance of 
counler-cyclical policy is no longer identified with a fixed rnorretary growth-rats rule. Moreover, I 
sii.f;pi?<:i,  though  i  cannot clociirnei\t i!, that rr;csre  c?c;onornists nov~  pay serious attentior1 tc:  iFie 
monetarists' concerns about lags and i'orecasi error:;  arid to the possibiiiiy uf sociAly p:!:rvc!  !;:? 
reason. Appendix 
Table 1 shows the effect of changes in the stock of unborrowed reser7Je:; 
or no.ney  on nominal income as estimated in 1975 by eight econometric 
models. The substantial differences shown by these models also appear 
in a comparison of models for a later period than the one discussed 
here. (See Adams and Klein 1990) 
Table 1 
D:yn?mic Multipliers: Nominal GNP/Unborred Reserves or Money Stock 
SEA  DRI-74  FRB  YIPS  Wharton  H-C  Wharton  LLU-f.;  . 
St.  Mark 111* Annual Annual  !,:!3:7  t 1 
Lo11 1  s 
REA.  ..........  U.  S  .  Departmerlt of  Commerce, Bureau of  Ecorlomic Anal;.sLc 
DRI  ...........  Data Resources Inc. 
FRB St. Louis. Federal Reserve Ba.nk  of St. Louis 
Whart~m  .......  Wharton Econometrics 
H-C  ...........  Hickam-Coen model 
Liu-Hwa  .......  Lie-Hwa monthly model 
*  Standard Anticipations Model 
Note: The policies simulated with thc various models are not exactly the 
same, but are close. 
Surce: Fromm and Klein (1976,  p.  25) REFERENCES 
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